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Science has transformed the way we live, how long we live. It has
meant the steady spread of improvements of a kind new to human
experience, and it has brought a level of fear that is also new.
–David McCullough**
I. INTRODUCTION
Human relationships with one another are extraordinarily complex, yet
that complexity pales in comparison to their relationships with nature.
Carbon, air, water, sunlight, and various organic nutrients provide us with
the essential stuff of life. Yet lightning, floods, volcanoes, earthquakes,
tornadoes, tigers, viruses, and other natural phenomena can snuff out
human life in the twinkling of an eye. Advances in civilization over the
millennia are largely a result of men and women putting science
(understanding nature) and technology (applying nature) to work, of
bending nature to serve human will. Just as fire, water, and other natural
elements on the planet produce suffering as well as succor to human
beings, so too do the fruits of science and technology. While facilitating
the hunt for food, spears and gunpowder are also used to injure and
subjugate other persons. Even the wheel, which so greatly expands our
ability to gather resources, also extends our capacity for destruction when
attached to chariots and tanks. A list of how technology has been put to use
to advance the human race, while also causing it great hardship, could fill
ten thousand volumes.
Over the last two centuries, explosive advances in science and
technology have propelled production of a dizzying array of new tools
reducing work, expanding human potential, and enriching lives in myriad
ways. Developments in lamps, medicines, mechanical engines, railroads,
gas and then electric lights, radios, televisions, and cell phones represent
just a small sampling of the profusion of technological enhancements to
human life. Today, persons to a large extent accomplish their individual
and collective objectives, and relate to one another, through the products of
science and technology—such as automobiles, punch presses, drain
cleaners, tractors, airplanes (civilian and military), prescription drugs,
medical devices, computers, frozen foods, tennis rackets, and perfumes.1
** DAVID MCCULLOUGH, BRAVE COMPANIONS: PORTRAITS IN HISTORY 211 (Simon &
Schuster 1992).
1. See generally Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1995)
(explaining how the law embraces a theory of product dynamism).
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Yet, sometimes, such products cause collateral damage, injuring and
killing human beings.
It is the job of law, drawing from customs, morals, and practical
politics, to prescribe who bears the economic risk of harmful consequences
from bending nature—those who exploit it or those who are harmed
thereby. Early law had simple rules of strict (if limited) accountability for
harm from human enterprise.2 Over the last couple of centuries, the law has
bent that early notion, reshaping doctrine with principles of foreseeability
and fault in order to shelter actors from excessive responsibility for harm
from putting nature to productive use. As enterprises have harvested
science and technology, foisting new and sometimes unknown risks on
human beings, the concept of unforeseeability has served to protect firms
from legal responsibility for harmful consequences beyond those they
reasonably should anticipate. Fault itself, of course, grounds this limitation
on responsibility for harm in basic moral theory.3 Yet, foreseeability is a
more elemental concept that swirls throughout fault and other aspects of
private law, assuring that accountability for the harmful consequences of
behavior is rooted in human will.4
Scholars of private law have long framed the central issue of
responsibility for harm, whether generally5 or as applied to science and
technology,6 in terms of the great divide between fault and strict liability.
2. See, e.g., NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS
225 (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 1997) (“From the fifteenth
century down to the Industrial Revolution around 1850, the common law adhered to a principle of
strict liability.”); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 85 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, &
DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 21–22 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]; Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,
37 VA. L. REV. 359, 364–65 (1951). Other scholars argue that early law more robustly embraced a
complex combination of liability concepts. See, e.g., ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF
TORT LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM 3–4, 63–66 (Carolina
Academic Press 2005); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 641, 679 (1989).
3. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 171 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995);
DAVID G. OWEN, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 201 (David G. Owen ed., Oxford University Press, Clarendon 1995); Arthur Ripstein,
Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 361, 362 (2004).
4. See generally David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277,
1278, 1281–90 (2009) (explaining how moral responsibility for consequences is grounded in their
foreseeability).
5. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 212 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(examining the divide between fault and strict liability in the law of torts); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 171 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (“[S]trict liability [is] often regarded as the
great competitor of negligence liability.”); Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 BUFF.
L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2008).
6. “Technical information relevant to the issue of due care lies at the uncertain frontiers of
modern science and technology.” Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM.
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1

572

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

No doubt the comparative merits and frailties of these opposing systems of
accountability are fundamentally important. Yet, the spotlight shone on
economic and philosophic aspects of these competing ideologies has left in
the shadows the analytic fulcrum that properly defines the outer bounds of
responsibility for harm from technology gone awry. That fulcrum is
foreseeability.
This Article begins to fill that gap, by illuminating foreseeability’s
sometimes hidden role over the last half century in framing the debate on
whether private law should hold actors accountable for the harmful effects
of new technology, even if those consequences are unforeseen. This Article
also opens debate on how a role for foreseeability might be fashioned for
this context where consequences become ever harder to predict as science
peels back the essential building blocks of nature, and as technology
reconstructs nature in uncharted ways. The issue explored here is one that
private law increasingly will confront: whether actors (usually firms)
should bear, or be protected from, legal responsibility for the unforeseeable
risks of bending nature. Put otherwise, the question addressed here is
whether and how the law should bend itself to address accountability for
harm in this brave new world.
Penetrating to the heart of responsibility for harm, the problem of
unforeseeable risk forces courts and policy makers to reexamine the goals
of private law, including a host of fundamental questions: Who should bear
the costs and benefits of changes in science and technology that develop
over time? How should the law deal with changes in public attitudes
toward risk, producer liability, individual responsibility, and legal
doctrine? Are jurors of varying ages capable of fairly judging products
made before they were born, or made just last year, according to the
science, technology, values, and standards of the time when those products
were invented, made, and sold? Is the judicial system capable of resolving
these problems in a principled manner through the development of
common law, or is the legislature a preferable forum for drawing basic
liability lines? Should the law place primary (or exclusive) jurisdiction in
regulatory agencies to try to discover and prevent these types of hazards
before the fact? These are just a few of the many perplexing questions with
which courts and policymaking institutions increasingly will have to
grapple, questions that lie on the cutting edge of modern science and the
law. The purpose of this Article is to begin that journey.
L. REV. 1080, 1097–98 (1966); see also Li Han, The Product Quality Law in China: A Proper
Balance Between Consumers and Producers?, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1 (2003); Siddharth
Khanijou, Patent Inequity?: Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to Patent Law in the
Nanotechnology Era, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 179, 183 (2007); David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744–46;
William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
639, 639.
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Part II of this Article probes the underlying problem: how the
accelerating pace of science is opening up a vast universe of unknown
risks. Part III examines private law’s initial, blunt efforts to address the
consequences of technology twisting nature into harm. This Part chronicles
the law’s experiment, beginning in the 1960s, in holding producers
“strictly” liable for unforeseeable risks from the products of technology, an
experiment that expelled foreseeability from its classic anchoring role in
private law. Part IV then explains how the law began to heal itself by
reviving foreseeability, as various features of the great strict liability
experiment unraveled, one by one. Part V next explores how foreseeability
presents the greatest challenge to private law in a modern world where
science and technology can be expected to go awry in many ways that
cannot specifically be predicted, but where unexpected consequences,
sometimes harmful, are inevitable. The Article concludes that the moral
power and flexibility of foreseeability render it superior to a rule of strict
liability in setting the boundaries of responsibility for harm from rapid
advances in science and technology.
II. BENDING NATURE AND THE PROBLEM OF UNFORESEEABLE RISK
Foreseeability, long a central feature of private law, helps define and
delimit responsibility for causing harm.7 Harmful action can hardly be
viewed as “wrong” if the actor could not possibly have contemplated that
the action might produce the harm. Moreover, because the effects of all
behavior extend forever,8 “no coherent conception of responsibility can
suppose that a person is responsible for everything that could be called a
consequence of her actions.”9 If roughly stated, it is largely true that “a
defendant is responsible for and only for such harm as he could reasonably
have foreseen and prevented.”10 In short, foreseeability is the moral thread
that helps define and bind together interpersonal obligations, personal
wrongdoing, and the extent of responsibility therefor.11
7. In 1850, for example, Baron Pollock opined that “no defendant should ever be held liable
for consequences which no reasonable person would expect to follow from the conduct.” PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, at 280–81 (summarizing Greenland v. Chaplin, (1850) 5
Exch. Rep. 243, 243–48 (U.K.)). See generally P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS: A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW
21–45 (15th ed.1951) (1887) (examining foreseeability’s role in tort); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate
Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991)
(tracing history of foreseeability in proximate cause); Owen, supra note 4 (probing foreseeability).
8. “In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and beyond. ‘The fatal trespass done by Eve
was [the] cause of all our woe.’” WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
236 (4th ed. 1971) (paraphrasing lines from JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST Book IX (1667)).
9. Ripstein, supra note 3, at 374.
10. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 231 (2d ed. 1985) (1959).
11. See Owen, supra note 4.
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Current advances in technology, however, may strain foreseeability’s
vaunted place in the pantheon of tort. In recent decades, humans have
moved beyond merely harnessing energy to “bending” it—reconfiguring
the way in which atoms and genes normally are put together, altering the
natural constructs of physics and biology, sometimes with explosive
results. Most conspicuous, of course, was the development of atomic and
then hydrogen bombs in the middle of the twentieth century. More
recently, scientists have changed the genetic makeup of food, cloned
animals, spliced genes, dispersed cell phones to all corners of the globe,
developed new drugs, and have begun to manipulate the atomic construct
of everyday products through the marvels of nanotechnology. A few
examples illustrate how very fast and far science and technology are
pushing the kinds of products humans use and consume on a daily basis,
often with unknown risks.
Re-engineered Food. Scientific meddling with nature in recent years
has wormed its way into the most fundamental of all products—food. Over
the past few decades, scientists have put growth hormones to substantial
use in beef production and developed biotech crops. The marketing of such
re-engineered food products has rapidly increased in America and other
nations in recent years.12 American farmers now routinely implant cattle
with synthetic hormones that mimic natural steroids, such as testosterone,
in order to accelerate weight gain and enhance the efficiency of cattle
feed.13 Biotech crops (genetically modified organisms or “GMOs”) are the
result of inserting an organism’s genes into the DNA of a plant, for such
purposes as insect and weed resistance.14 As of 2007, more than 90% of all
soybeans (and 87% of cotton) planted in the United States was genetically
engineered in this manner, as was nearly three quarters of all corn.15
12. Growth hormones are now used in about 80% of the beef produced in the United States.
The Center for Food Safety, Other Hormones, http://truefoodnow.org/campaigns/rbgh-andhormones/other-hormones/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). By 2007, 282 million acres were devoted
globally to biotech crops, up from just 7 million acres in 1996. Press Release, Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), Agricultural Biotechnology Continues to Increase Crop Yield and
Farmer Income Worldwide While Supporting the Environment (Feb. 13, 2008), available at
http://bio.org/news/pressreleases/newsitem.asp?id=2008_0213_01. Quite recently, China approved
genetically modified rice, opening the door for the first large-scale production of this staple crop in
a genetically enhanced form. Andrew Batson & James T. Areddy, Beijing Gives Nod To Modified
Rice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2009, at A13.
13. The United States Mission to the European Union, A Primer on Beef Hormones (Feb. 26,
1999), http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Beef_Hormones/Feb2699_Primer.asp; U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA), CENTER FOR VETERINARY
MEDICINE, STEROID HORMONES (2002), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/
ProductSafetyInformation/ucm055436.htm.
14. Debra M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S.
Biotechnology Industry in the EU Ban of Genetically Modified Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 777
(2008).
15. Id. at 778–79. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service publishes
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While hormone-spurred beef and biotech plants improve upon nature in
some respects, they harm it in another. Resulting toxins in such food
products are eaten by humans, animals, and insects, and the long-term
effects on human health and safety quite simply are unknown.16 For this
reason, Europe remains skeptical of whether the benefits of such modified
foods are worth the costs. The European Union first banned the import of
meat containing growth hormones in the 1980s,17 and it still maintains its
ban despite sanctions imposed by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”).18 In keeping with the “precautionary principle” that governs
decisions of the European Commission,19 “the Directive seeks to
avoid . . . the potential for [adverse health] effects to occur.”20 Although
the European Commission began to allow the sale of genetically modified
sweet corn for human consumption in 2004,21 a number of European
annual statistics on the adoption of genetically engineered crops in the United States. See U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. (USDA), ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, ADOPTION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
CROPS IN THE U.S., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
16. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 14, at 779; see also Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The
Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2007)
(cataloguing risks, including toxicity, allergenicity, antibiotic resistance, negative nutritional
impact, unintended health effects, insect resistance, harm to nontarget organisms, outcrossing, and
damage to the balance of the ecosystem). “Long-term scientific studies in humans have not yet been
done [and there is] substantial scientific uncertainty concerning these substances . . . .” Strauss,
supra note 14, at 779–80.
17. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., USDA, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE INFORMATION NETWORK (GAIN),
EUROPEAN UNION TRADE POLICY MONITORING EUROPEAN UNION BANS ESTRADIOL 2 (2003),
available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200310/145986428.pdf. Directive 2003/74/EC
amending Council Directive 96/22/EC, signed September 22, 2003, prohibits the use of oestradiol17β, testosterone, progesterone, zeranol, trenbolone acetate, and melengestrol acetate in foodproducing animals except for the use of oestradiol-17β therapeutic purposes. Council Directive
2003/74/EC, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17–19, available at http://www.fve.org/veterinary/
pdf/food/directive_2003_74.pdf. The ban is “necessary to achieve the chosen level of health
protection from the residues in meat of farm animals treated with . . . hormones for growth
promotion purposes.” Id.
18. Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), New Issues Arise in EU-US Beef Trade
Dispute, 9 BRIDGES TRADE BIORES 12, June 26, 2009, available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/
biores/49559/; Roberta Rampton, Beef Deal A Gleam of Hope for US-EU Trade Tensions,
REUTERS, May 6, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE5457S–
720090506. The World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body criticized the EU for not
basing the ban on a “valid risk assessment.” See Darrell Chichester, Comment, Battle of the Beef,
the Rematch: An Evaluation of the Latest E.C. Directive Banning Beef Produced with Growth
Hormones and the U.S. Refusal to Accept the Directive as WTO Compliant, 21 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 221, 229, 234–35 (2005).
19. Press Release, Europa, Commission Adopts Communication on Precautionary Principle
(Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/96&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
20. Chichester, supra note 18, at 256–57.
21. European Union Lifts GM Food Ban, BBC NEWS, May 19, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3727827.stm.
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countries, hostile to this type of “Frankenstein food,”22 continue to ban it
notwithstanding pressure from the WTO.23
Electronic Cigarettes. A quite remarkable new consumer product, the
electronic cigarette (“e-cig”), was developed in China in 2002 and
commercially introduced in Asia in 2005.24 Recently, the e-cig has spread
to Europe and to the United States, although the Food and Drug
Administration considers it an unapproved new drug.25 E-cigs, which look
remarkably like ordinary cigarettes, simulate the sensation of smoking a
normal cigarette: by sucking the mouthpiece, the user activates a batterypowered microprocessor, which controls an atomizer.26 The atomizer emits
a nicotine-based vapor that simulates smoke.27
Marketers describe e-cigs as “a healthier and cheaper alternative to
traditional cigarettes,”28 but there has been little testing of the health effects
22. See Marco Contiero & Mark Breddy, Luxembourg To Become Fifth EU Country to Ban
Monsanto GM Maize, GREENPEACE, Mar. 23, 2009, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/euunit/press-centre/press-releases2/luxembourg-mon810-ban-230309; Germany Bans Cultivation of
GM Corn, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 14, 2009, available at http://www.commondreams.org/
headline/2009/04/14-3; Pete Harrison, EU Upholds Austria, Hungary Right to Ban GM Crops,
REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environment/News/ idUSTR–
E5212OL20090302.
23. Strauss, supra note 14, at 776. Unlike Europe, the United States “does not require
labeling, segregating, or monitoring” of genetically engineered crops because the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) considers those organisms of “substantial equivalence” to naturally occurring
ones. Id. at 779–80. The FDA also applies the concept of “substantial equivalence” to cloned
animals, concluding that “there are no additional risks to people eating food from cattle, swine, and
goat clones or the offspring of any animal clones traditionally consumed as food.” U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA, CONSUMER UPDATE, ANIMAL CLONING AND FOOD SAFETY(2008),
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm148768.htm.
24. See eciginfo, What Is an Electronic Cigarette?, http://www.eciginfo.co.uk/whatisanecig.
html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
25. Danielle Dellorto, FDA Hazy on E-Cigarettes’ Safety, CNN, Mar. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/03/13/ecigarettes.smoking/index.html (stating that the FDA is
“trying to halt importation of e-cigs, but isn’t seizing products already being sold in the United
States”); see also Lyndsey Layton, FDA Cautions Public About Electronic Cigarettes, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/ 22/
AR2009072202902.html (reporting that the FDA is concerned about carcinogens in e-cigs and has
warned the public against their use); Duff Wilson, Judge Orders F.D.A. to Stop Blocking Imports of
E-Cigarettes From China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/15/business/15smoke.html (reporting federal court order restraining FDA from blocking
importation of e-cigarettes). How the FDA will regulate electronic cigarettes in view of its new
authority over tobacco products remains to be seen. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2-3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1778–82 (2009) (to be codified at 21
U.S.C. § 387).
For an internet advertisement (a “$99 Value,” “FREE”), see SmokeAssassinTM,
http://www.smokeassassin.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
26. See ecinginfo, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Ecig Online, About Us, Ecig Online, http://www.electroniccigaretteonline.co.uk/ecigonline-about-us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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of the substances in their vapor.29 The World Health Organization has
questioned the evidentiary basis of marketing claims that e-cigs help
people quit smoking, and there are no rigorous, peer-reviewed studies
showing that e-cigs are either a safe or effective nicotine replacement
therapy.30 At least the United Kingdom requires that extensive warnings
accompany the sale of electronic cigarettes.31
Nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is miniature technology, on an
atomic or molecular scale, where matter is manipulated at less than one
hundred nanometers in size.32 Nanotechnology is an emerging field33 of
limitless potential because nanoscale materials possess physical, chemical,
optical, electrical, catalytic, magnetic, adhesive, mechanical, and possibly
even biologic properties that are fundamentally distinct from their larger
counterparts.34 For example, due to its antimicrobial properties,
nanoparticle silver is now infused into numerous consumer goods such as
clothing, toys, and personal care products to combat germs.35
Some worry that the same characteristics that make nanoparticles so
attractive—their tiny size, high ratio of surface area to volume, and
reactivity—also pose unique and untold risks to human health.36 For
example, the diameter, length, and biopersistence of nanoparticles
generally, and carbon nanotubes in particular, has raised concerns that, if
such microscopic particles are inhaled into the lungs, asbestos-like
reactions could ensue.37 The miniature nature of inhaled nanoparticals also
29. Different flavors are available, but the tobacco flavor is the most popular. See ecinginfo,
supra note 24.
30. News Release, World Health Org., Marketers of Electronic Cigarettes Should Halt
Unproved Therapy Claims (Sept. 19, 2008) available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
releases/2008/pr34/en/print.html.
31. See Ecig Online, Electronic Cigarette Health & Safety Guide: Ecig Online, Electronic
Cigarette Health & Safety Guidelines, http://www.electroniccigaretteonline.co.uk/electroniccigarette-safety.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (setting forth mandated warnings of risks of
contact with the skin and eyes, harm to unborn children, and nicotine’s toxicity).
32. See Khanijou, supra note 6, at 181. A nanometer is 10-9 meters, which is one billionth of
a meter. See id.; Leonard Sweet & Bradford Strohm, Nanotechnology—Life-Cycle Risk
Management, 12 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 528, 530 (2006).
33. There are now more than 1,000 nanotechnology-enabled consumer products available
around the world. See The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN), Nanotech-enabled
Consumer Products Top the 1,000 Mark, http://www.nanotechproject.org/news/archive/8277/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2010).
34. Sweet & Strohm, supra note 32, at 532; see also Ronald C. Wernette, The Dawn of the
Age of Nanotorts, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Apr. 23, 2009). See generally MARSHALL S.
SHAPO, EXPERIMENTING WITH THE CONSUMER: THE MASS TESTING OF RISKY PRODUCTS ON THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC ch. 7 (Greenwood 2009) (addressing “Experiments at the Billionth Level”).
35. Rick Weiss, Groups Petition EPA to Ban Nanosilver in Consumer Goods, WASH. POST,
May 2, 2008, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/
05/01/AR2008050103228.html?hpid=topnews.
36. Id.
37. Nanoparticles might be thin enough to reach the sensitive areas of the lungs, long enough
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allows them to migrate from the lungs into the blood stream and threaten
vital organs, including the brain.38 Nanoparticles may also damage cells
and chromosomes; cause inflammation; and interfere with the signaling
pathways of cells, cell division, and cardiac function.39 Without sufficient
toxicity data, it simply is impossible to ascertain what levels of exposure
may be safe and what levels may injure human beings.40 Risk-assessment
models for nanoparticles are in their infancy,41 and, in the absence of such
proven models, the risks from nanoparticles remain “largely unknown and,
in all likelihood, unknowable until time passes.”42
Other New Technologies. Re-engineered foods, e-cigs, and nanotech
products of all types provide just a tiny sampling of the vast advances in
the products of science and technology whose risks are often quite
unknown. Synthetic biology is another developing field in which scientists
redesign existing biological systems and even create entirely new
biological components alien to the natural world.43 Among its many
applications, synthetic biology has developed a powerful, new anti-malaria
drug44—with risks, however, whose nature and extent remain outside
to avoid the lungs’ built-in defense systems, and persistent enough to remain without dissolving for
many years. Pat Rizzuto, Nanotechnology: Report Looks at Nanoparticle Characteristics That
Could Raise Asbestos-Like Concerns, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://news.bna.com/pldm/ (search “Report looks at Nanoparticle Characteristics”; then follow
“01/28/2009: Nanotechnology: Report Looks at Nanoparticle Characteristics” hyperlink) (including
report from United Kingdom Institute of Occupational Medicine); see also LLOYD’S, RISKS:
LLOYD’S EMERGING RISKS TEAM REPORT, NANOTECHNOLOGY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, RISKS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 14 (2007), available at http://www.nanet.nu/upload/centre/nanet/nyheder/
lloydsemergingrisksteamreport_nanotechnology_report.pdf.
38. Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1342 (2008);
Wernette, supra note 34.
39. Sweet & Strohm, supra note 32, at 545. Nanoparticles also pose unknown, possibly
serious, environmental risks. See id. at 544; Wernette, supra note 34.
40. Sweet & Strohm, supra note 32, at 544; see also Pat Rizzuto, Cell Tests Can Produce
Any Desired Result About Nanomaterial Toxicity, Speaker Says, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 18,
2009), available at http://news.bna.com/pldm/ (search “Tests Can Produce Any Desired Result”;
then follow “11/18/2009: Science Policy: Cell Tests Can Produce Any Desired Result About
Nanomaterial Toxicity, Speaker Says” hyperlink).
41. “The science needed to assess hazards of nanomaterials in the fields of toxicology,
epidemiology, and industrial hygiene, let alone meeting the standards for admissibility of such
scientific evidence under Daubert, is likely to be many years in the making.” Wernette, supra note
34.
42. Id. At least one insurer has refused to cover “bodily injury, property damage, or personal
and advertising injury” from nanoparticles. Pat Rizzuto, Insurance Group Excludes Nanotubes,
Nanotechnology From Coverage as of Nov. 15, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 10, 2008).
43. ETC GROUP, EXTREME GENETIC ENGINEERING: AN INTRODUCTION TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
1 (2007), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/602/01/synbioreportweb.pdf.
44. Synthetic Biology Can Help Extend Anti-Malaria Drug Effectiveness, SCIENCEDAILY,
Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090306172619.htm
(reporting on the engineering of microbes to ferment artemisinin, “the most powerful anti-malaria
drug in use today”).
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current understanding.45 With such complex organisms engineered from
scratch, their behavioral properties, interactions, and mutational potential46
are “difficult—if not impossible—to predict.”47 In another startling
development, scientists just recently claimed to have manipulated stem
cells in a laboratory to create both human sperm and eggs, raising critical
questions about how such technology might be put to use and a host of
unfathomable implications for “humans” who might one day be spawned
in such a way.48 Radiation is another technology with new uses whose
benefits are clear: food irradiation kills harmful bacteria, preserves food,
and controls insects.49 Yet, irradiation may alter the chemical formulations
of foods in ways that cause unknown toxic risks to human beings.50 As a
final example, cell phones are a ubiquitous instrument of modern
technology and modern life, but there remains a question whether they
cause cancer of the brain.51
45. See ETC GROUP, EXTREME GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 43, at 52–55 (admitting that
“[n]o one knows if synthetic biology will ultimately deliver safe and sufficient quantities of lowcost artemisinin for controlling malaria in the developing world”). The most dreadful risk of
synthetic biology is the possibility that a terrorist might use a viral pathogen as a weapon, the
plausibility of which was demonstrated when a university virologist built live poliovirus “from
scratch using mail-order segments of DNA and a viral genome map that is freely available on the
Internet.” Philip Ball, Starting From Scratch, 431 NATURE 624, 624 (2004), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v431/n7009/full/431624a.html.
46. Denise Caruso, Synthetic Biology: An Overview and Recommendations for Anticipating
and Addressing Emerging Risks, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Nov. 12, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/syntheticbiology.pdf.
47. Sara Goodman, Technology: Synthetic Biology Signals Regulatory Challenges Ahead,
E&E PUBL’G, LLC, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/print/2009/03/26/8.
48. Fiona Macrae, No Men OR Women Needed: Scientists Create Sperm and Eggs from Stem
Cells, MAILONLINE, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1223617/Nomen-OR-women-needed-artificial-sperm-eggs-created-time.html (“Human eggs and sperm have
been grown in the laboratory in research which could change the face of parenthood.”); cf. Donovan
v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting mother’s claims against
commercial sperm bank for abnormal condition of daughter spawned by defective sperm).
49. Alliance for Social & Ecological Consumer Organisations (ASECO), Food Irradiation
(Apr. 18, 2007), http://aseconet.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&
Itemid=31.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Do Cell Phones Increase Brain Cancer Risk?, SCIENCE DAILY, Oct. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/10/081020093456.htm (noting an
epidemiologic study by a Swedish research group “suggesting an increased risk of brain cancers
(gliomas) as well as acoustic nerve tumors (neuromas) in people using cell phones for ten years or
longer”); Geoffrey Lean, Mobile Phone Use ‘Raises Children’s Risk of Brain Cancer Fivefold,’ THE
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/
mobile-phone-use-raises-childrens-risk-of-brain-cancer-fivefold-937005.html. For the published
study referenced to in the latter article, see Lennart Hardell et al., Epidemiological Evidence for an
Association Between Use of Wireless Phones and Tumor Diseases, 16 PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 113
(2009). See generally Elizabeth Landau, Scientists Debate Possible Cell Phone Link to Brain
Cancer, CNN, Sept. 25, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/09/25/cellphones.
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Technologies such as these, and myriad others beyond current
imagination, increasingly will define the unfolding world in which humans
live. In such a world, where bending nature in elemental ways may unleash
any number of risks, we must ask whether the traditional faultforeseeability model of responsibility for harm is adequate to the task, or
whether instead this traditional liability model fails. Mankind now has
crossed the Rubicon into a brand new world, by altering the rudiments of
matter and life—smashing and tearing apart atoms, the building blocks of
the universe; re-engineering the foundations of plant and animal life;
remaking (through cloning, cell manipulation, synthetic biology, etc.)
animals52 and, increasingly, humans themselves. In such a world, where
humans bend nature so far and fundamentally that they may be said to be
“playing God,” such conduct undoubtedly will sometimes accidentally
produce harmful consequences impossible to predict. Such consequences
might be labeled “foreseeably unforeseeable”—the inevitable yet
unknowable consequences of monkeying with nature in fundamental ways.
In this quite extraordinary, new context, where persons and firms
intentionally alter the rudiments of nature, we may fairly ask whether such
actors should be deemed to surrender conventional rights to have
responsibility for untoward harm defined by traditional rules of
foreseeability and fault. That is, when humans deliberately bend nature to
the point of unforeseeability, it may just be that action, harm, and
responsibility reduce to a single point.
III. FORESEEABILITY’S DECLINE
For most of the twentieth century, as so prominently proclaimed by
Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company,53
foreseeability stood tall and proud at the center of responsibility for harm.
This was the state of private law in America when the century passed its
mid-point, as industry settled down to the business of putting to work the
new science and technologies (including the splitting of the atom)
developed in World War II. Foreseeability then was widely acknowledged
to be a great moral pillar of the law, anchoring personal and firm
responsibility for choices to consequences that a reasonable person should
contemplate when deciding whether or not to act. The limitation of liability
cancer/index.html?iref=newssearch (discussing conflicting congressional testimony on the brain
cancer risk from cell phones).
Adding to the confusion, recent animal studies suggest that cell phones may actually enhance a
user’s cognitive abilities. Cellphone Radiation Aids Sick Mice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2010, at D4.
52. Hannah Devlin, Chinese Researchers Clone Tiny the Mouse from Skin Cells, TIMES
ONLINE (London), July 24, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/article6725624.ece
(reporting that scientists have cloned mice by reprogramming adult mouse skin cells into embryolike stem cells).
53. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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on this basis—holding actors liable only for foreseeable risk, and
protecting even negligent actors from harm they cannot anticipate—was
then a central organizing feature of private law.54
By the 1950s, most American states finally had completed their
embrace of the rule in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.55 that ejected
privity as a bar to consumer negligence claims against manufacturers of
defective products.56 The decade of the 1950s was a time of outward calm
in the law of tort, although legal theorists57 and warranty law
developments58 were toiling and boiling below the surface, completing
foundational work for the explosive developments that soon would follow.
In particular, courts during these years increasingly held manufacturers
strictly liable in warranty for injuries to consumers caused by defective
food, cosmetics, and similar products.59
A. The Great Strict Liability Experiment
In the 1960s, an ever-increasing array of products caused greater and
greater harm to human beings at home, in the workplace, and in the world
at large. As Senator Warren Magnuson declared in 1967, in urging
Congress to establish a commission to study product safety, “today we face
an unparalleled profusion of new products spawned by space-age
technology” widely broadening consumer harm.60 This growing injury toll
from new technologies was the backdrop the courts confronted in this
decade when private law exploded and modern products liability law burst
54. On the prominent role of foreseeability in private law, see, for example, Owen, supra note
4; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1247 (2009).
55. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
56. For the story of MacPherson, see James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Company: Simplifying the Facts While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41 (Robert L. Rabin
& Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
57. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957); Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34
TEX. L. REV. 192, 192 (1955); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products—The Drift Toward Strict
Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 963 (1957); see also VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN,
UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 6–8, 13 (1995); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (elegantly
critiqued in David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Liability Law: A
Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529 (1985)); see
generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.4 (2d ed. 2008) (chronicling
developments in legal theory).
58. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103–04 (1960) (chronicling warranty law judicial developments moving
toward strict producer liability).
59. See id. at 1104, 1107–09.
60. See NAT’L COMM’N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 123 (1970).
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forth, like Athena, as a warrior fully clothed in armor ready to do battle for
consumers injured by the products of science and technology gone awry.
This was the decade when principles of responsibility for unexpected
harm from technology quite suddenly were turned upside down—when
private law ejected traditional notions of negligence and foreseeable risk
from liability determinations and replaced such concepts with a principle
of “strict” liability for manufacturers of defective products. This sharp turn
in the law began the Great Strict Liability Experiment,61 a seismic shift in
legal doctrine marked by two central, overlapping developments. The first
development, and most conspicuous one, was tort law’s opening of its
arms to users and consumers injured by defective products at the expense
of manufacturers held strictly liable for that harm. The second
development, muted yet making possible the first, was the law’s closing of
the foreseeability umbrella that for so long had sheltered industry from
responsibility for the unexpected consequences of science and technology.
If the start of this development must be dated, it would be May 9, 1960.
On that day, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,62 which allowed a non-purchaser who
was injured in an accident caused by a defective car to sue the
manufacturer despite two classic obstacles to strict liability claims brought
in warranty: the absence of privity of contract and the presence of a
contractual disclaimer purporting to bar such claims. A few weeks later, in
the June issue of the Yale Law Journal, Dean William L. Prosser published
his celebrated article63 “describing and predicting exactly the change in the
law that Henningsen had introduced.”64 Not long thereafter, in 1963, the
Supreme Court of California decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,65 the landmark case which declared that manufacturers of defective
products are strictly liable in tort to persons injured by such products,
irrespective of any contractual limitations that might inhere in the law of
warranty. In 1964, the American Law Institute adopted (and in 1965
officially promulgated) § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts—the
rule of strict products liability in tort.
For the rest of the 1960s, 1970s, and into the early 1980s, the doctrine
of strict products liability in tort, together with a miscellany of secondary
principles, spread like wildfire across America. This was no trivial
development. Tort law has probably never witnessed such a rapid,
widespread, and altogether explosive change in a rule and theory of legal
61. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955,
955–57 (2007) (illuminating this development); Priest, supra note 57 (examining this
development).
62. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
63. Prosser, supra note 58.
64. Priest, supra note 57, at 505.
65. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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responsibility.66 This was the period in which the law tore down the old
protections that, since the beginning of the industrial revolution, had
shielded industry from most injury costs arising from its new
technologies—warranty law limitations based on privity of contract, notice,
and disclaimers; absolute defenses based on a victim’s conduct; and
negligence law requirements of proof of fault and foreseeability of risk.
B. Foreseeability Derogated
As the idea of strict products liability accelerated during the 1960s and
1970s, the law in various ways stomped out unforeseeability as a “defense”
that might defeat this radical theory of responsibility for injury costs
flowing from new technology. Most fundamentally, “strict” liability
doctrine rests on the idea that manufacturers should be liable for physical
harm from defective products even if that harm is unforeseeable. That is,
particularly for dangers in a product’s design or warnings, differences
between negligence and strict liability are grounded in the limitation of
responsibility in negligence doctrine to risks that are foreseeable—a
limitation challenged by strict liability.
In these early days of modern products liability law, in an effort to
distinguish the then-new doctrine of strict products liability in tort from
negligence, some courts and commentators sought explicitly to expel the
foreseeability limitations of negligence law from strict tort doctrine. In one
early case, for example, the court remarked:
Negligence is, of course, tested in terms of
foreseeability. . . . The focus of § 402A, however, is not
directed to the foreseeability of a given injury, but to whether
“the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”67
This view, that producers of new technology should bear responsibility for
unforeseeable risks such products might contain, well reflected the populist
sentiments that dominated tort law in the 1960s.68
Only sometimes explicit, derogation of foreseeability was more often
implicitly embedded in various aspects of products liability doctrine—the
66. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 58, at 793–94 (proclaiming the adoption of strict products
liability in the early 1960s to be “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an
established rule in the entire history of the law of torts”); see also NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 57, at
105 (characterizing the spread of § 402A doctrine as “the strict products liability ‘revolution,’ the
most spectacular episode of judicial creativity in the history of American tort law”).
67. Eshbach v. W. T. Grant’s & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 942–43 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965)).
68. See David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Liability Law: A
Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529, 532–33 (1985).
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consumer expectations liability test, the Wade-Keeton liability test, and the
denial of a “state-of-the-art” defense. The first two features of the new
doctrine were formulations of a liability standard that was explicitly strict,
and both effectively expelled foreseeability from participation in
determining responsibility for harm. The third feature rejected a
manufacturer’s defensive plea based on the capabilities of the prevailing
science and technology at the time of manufacture.
1. The Consumer Expectations Test
A major development curtailing foreseeability’s role in the 1960s and
1970s was the widespread adoption of a liability test for strict liability
based on consumer safety expectations.69 Although its effect on
foreseeability was unheralded at the time, the development of a consumer
expectations test in products liability law served to displace foreseeability
by focusing entirely on the safety expectations of consumers—which
meant, of course, that the inquiry shifted commensurately away from
producers, whose expectations of product risks were thereby rendered
moot.
The immediate source of this sudden shift in focus was textual. In
interpreting the liability standard of § 402A—“defective condition
unreasonably dangerous”—courts first sought guidance from the
Reporter’s Comments that Dean Prosser wrote explaining that section of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment g, entitled “defective
condition,” explains that the new strict liability rule “applies only where
the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him.”70 And comment i, entitled “unreasonably dangerous,”
explains that this latter phrase means that the product “must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it.”71 Thus, for a product to be in “a defective
condition . . . unreasonably dangerous” under § 402A, it must be more
dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect.72
Protection of consumer expectations was a logical initial foundation for
strict products liability under § 402A since modern products liability law,
and § 402A in particular, evolved out of the law of warranty which by the
twentieth century had been absorbed into the law of sales and contracts.73
69. On the consumer expectations test, see, for example, Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer
Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 227 (1997); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1700 (2003); Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict
Liability Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189 (1994); Jerry J.
Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047 (2002).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
71. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
72. Id.
73. See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REV. 117, 118–22 (1943).
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One of the most basic goals of law in general,74 and the most fundamental
pillar of contract law,75 is the protection of the reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties. Warranty law is based on the seller’s explicit and
implicit representations made to consumers in sales transactions, and the
law fairly protects consumer expectations predictably generated by such
representations.76 Because the law of warranty that paved the way for
§ 402A seeks to protect a consumer’s ordinary or reasonable expectations,
this seemed, at the time, to be a natural liability test for the new tort
doctrine.77 Natural though it may have been, the consumer expectations
test left no room in the liability calculus for the foreseeability vel non of
risk to the manufacturers who put science and technology to work in the
factories of production.
2. The Wade-Keeton Test
While Dean Prosser defined strict liability in terms of consumer safety
expectations in the Reporter’s Comments to § 402A, other scholars
searched for alternative ways to define strict products liability in a manner
that distinguished it from mere negligence. Other than Prosser, the two
most prominent tort law scholars at the time who shared a special interest
in products liability were Dean John Wade of Vanderbilt University and
Dean Page Keeton of the University of Texas. As modern products liability
law was just beginning to emerge in the 1960s, the two deans, both
Advisers to the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts
whose products liability chapter was then in progress, offered separate yet
similar definitions of product defect that distinguished negligence-based
responsibility from a liability standard called “strict” in a fundamental way.
74. Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound remarked:
In civilized society men must be able to assume that those with whom they deal in
the general intercourse of society will act in good faith and hence . . . will make
good reasonable expectations which their promises or other conduct reasonably
create; [and] . . . will carry out their undertakings according to the expectations
which the moral sentiment of the community attaches thereto . . . .
ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 114 (Archon Books 1968) (1942).
75. The very first subtitle of a classic contract law treatise underscores this point:
“[Section] 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations
Induced by Promises.” See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 1993).
76. See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland’s Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 534 (Or. 1973) (“One can only
determine what a purchaser had a right to expect by the implications express or inherent in the sale
to him. These implications are analogous to those underlying a representation of merchantable
quality.”).
77. See David A. Fischer, Products Liability—The Meaning of Defect, 39 MO. L. REV. 339,
348 (1974). Then California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor perceptively observed
that the consumer contemplation test reflected the “surprise element of danger.” Roger J. Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 370
(1965).
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The test developed by Deans Wade and Keeton, which in time became
known as the “Wade-Keeton” test,78 quite simply was a negligence test
stripped of “scienter.”79 Both scholars proposed that a product defect be
defined in hindsight terms—whether a manufacturer or other seller with
full knowledge of a product’s dangers would be negligent in selling it in
that condition.80 Requiring a seller to know its product’s risks, thereby
imposing on the seller “constructive knowledge” of any dangers its
products might possess,81 commensurately relieved an injured plaintiff of
the burden of proving the foreseeability of those risks. The rise (and fall) of
the Wade-Keeton test is perhaps the single–most intriguing tale of modern
products liability law. An exploration of this fascinating story is examined
elsewhere in detail,82 and it will be returned to again below.83 Its
importance here is to note its prominence as an early effort to distinguish
strict liability from negligence in products liability theory84 by simply
stripping foreseeability from the liability standard.85

78. See, e.g., Privette v. CSX Transp., Inc., 79 F. App’x 879, 889 (6th Cir. 2003) (referring to
this liability standard more fully as “‘the Wade-Keeton prudent manufacturer test’”) (citation
omitted); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62 (N.M. 1995) (recognizing the “WadeKeeton approach”); Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 884 (2002) (referring
to the “Wade/Keeton test”).
79. See, e.g., John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 834–35 (1973). The Wade-Keeton test is examined generally in OWEN, supra note 57, § 8.7,
and from a state-of-the-art perspective in id., § 10.4, at 706–07, 715.
80. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Products Liability—Current Developments, 40 TEX. L. REV. 193,
194, 200 (1961); Page Keeton, Products Liability—The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964
U. ILL. L.F. 693, 702; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS.
L.J. 825, 834–35 (1973); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 15
(1965).
81. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974).
82. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 8.7, at 546–47.
83. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
84. A number of courts, themselves searching for a basis by which to distinguish strict
liability design (and warning) claims from those in negligence, picked up quite early on the WadeKeeton hindsight test. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759–60 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(applying this test), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d
1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) (“A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person
would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character. The test,
therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the
product.”); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 829 (N.J. 1978) (discussing and
endorsing the Wade-Keeton test).
85. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CUMB. L. REV. 293, 314–15 (1979). Dean Keeton pointed out that the difference between
negligence and strict liability was the requirement in negligence that the danger be foreseeable,
whereas, under his “strict” liability test, “it is irrelevant that the defendant did not know or had no
reason to know of the danger.” Id. at 315 n.87.
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3. Rejection of the State-of-the-Art Defense
A third way courts muted foreseeability during the 1960s and 1970s
was by rejecting a so-called “state-of-the-art” defense. Early in the
development of strict products liability law, considerable attention was
placed on whether manufacturers and other sellers should be able to defend
strict liability claims with proof that they could not foresee a risk or
otherwise avoid it under the science and technology prevailing at the time.
The state-of-the-art issue arises most pointedly in cases involving defective
warning claims where the manufacturer contends that it was incapable of
warning of a danger, not only because it did not recognize the risk itself,
but because the risk was unknowable under then-existing science and
technology.
This form of defense logically had been conclusive on negligence
claims for some time, since a manufacturer hardly could be faulted for
failing to foresee or eliminate a risk that was not reasonably foreseeable
under the state of scientific knowledge then available.86 Yet, the relevance
of state of the art to strict liability claims was more problematic. “Strict”
liability implies that liability is imposed for merely selling a product that is
too dangerous, according to some standard of excessive danger, not
whether the manufacturer or other seller should be faulted for selling the
product in that condition.87 If fault indeed is irrelevant to this form of
liability, state-of-the-art evidence logically would seem irrelevant to
whether a manufacturer is “strictly” responsible for selling a defective
product. This was the ruling in Johnson v. Raybestos–Manhattan, Inc.,88
which held in an asbestos case that state-of-the-art evidence on the
foreseeability of the risk is inadmissible on a strict liability tort claim,
reasoning that whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of
a product’s dangers, though relevant to negligence, simply has no bearing
on claims based on liability that is strict.89 Other early courts agreed.90 By
rejecting evidence of an industry’s technological limitations, early state-of86. Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909, 910 (4th Cir. 1955). More recently, see,
e.g., Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc., 512 F.3d 440, 452 (8th Cir. 2008); Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc.,
658 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ill. 1995).
87. This is axiomatic. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 5.3.
88. 740 P.2d 548 (Haw. 1987).
89. Id. at 549.
90. See, e.g., Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 458 P.2d 390, 392–93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)
(rejecting manufacturer’s arguments on its best efforts to make a rubber shower mat safe from the
risk of slipping in a tub as irrelevant state-of-the-art argument under § 402A); Lunt v. Brady Mfg.
Corp., 475 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (“It does not matter that the seller has done ‘the
best he can’ if the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous.”); Cunningham v. MacNeal
Mem’l Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ill. 1970) (“To allow a defense to strict liability on the ground
that there is no way, either practical or theoretical, for a defendant to ascertain the existence of
impurities in his product would be to emasculate the doctrine and in a very real sense would signal
a return to a negligence theory.”).
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the-art decisions such as these seriously obstructed foreseeability’s role in
limiting responsibility for harm.
IV. FORESEEABILITY’S RESURGENCE
A. Foreseeability’s Embers
To many observers in the late 1960s and 1970s, foreseeability’s flame
appeared to have been effectively stomped out of modern products liability
law by the rapid and widespread adoption of strict liability, with its
powerful combination of doctrine and policy. Stunned by the onslaught of
these developments, foreseeability remained largely dormant, smoldering,
for some time. Though dormant, foreseeability’s sparks never were
extinguished, but lay quietly glowing in the embers. Quite soon, these
sparks began to pop, and eventually to spring, if slowly and with hesitation,
into tiny flames of light. Indeed, the rekindling of foreseeability was
evident before the ink on § 402A had even dried. Ironically, these stirrings
of foreseeability’s revival drew succor from § 402A itself.
Notwithstanding the general “strictness” prescribed by § 402A’s
liability standard, two comments to that section, comments j and k,
explained that the duty to warn under § 402A was limited to foreseeable
risks.91 Most prominently, addressing warnings of possible allergic
reactions, comment j provided that warnings are necessary only if the seller
“has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human
skill and foresight should have knowledge” of the danger.92 Emphasizing
pharmaceutical drugs, comment k also suggested that the duty to warn was
limited to foreseeable risks.93 Together, these two comments appeared to
run directly counter to § 402A’s unstinting, black-letter strictness and the
Wade-Keeton test’s hindsight approach.
So, by the late 1960s, the stage was set for courts to begin to address
this fundamental clash of opposing notions as to whether producers have a
strict liability duty to warn of unknowable risks. Comments j and k to
§ 402A provided that the strict liability duty, as in negligence, was limited
to foreseeable risks; yet the Wade-Keeton hindsight test, imputing
knowledge of such risks to suppliers, required manufacturers to warn of
hazards whether foreseeable or not, buttressed by § 402A’s powerful
underlying idea that liability must somehow be “strict.”
91. Unrecognized until quite recently, these comments were drawn narrowly to cover the
warning duty only for products containing inherent, unavoidable risks. See David G. Owen, The
Puzzle of Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377 (2004). Even so, the unknown risks of new science
and technology often fall largely in this narrow category.
92. For a full examination of comment j to § 402A, see id.
93. Comment k to § 402A is examined in OWEN, supra note 57, §§ 6.2, 8.10.
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At least two cases during this early period addressed these issues. In
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt,94 the plaintiff’s scalp was burned
by a combination of chemical bleaching products manufactured by the
defendant.95 Endorsing the Wade-Keeton test, the court remarked that a
design, to be unreasonably dangerous, “must be so dangerous that a
reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew the risks involved.”96
But, similar to so many other courts that in time endorsed the WadeKeeton constructive knowledge standard, the Helene Curtis court seemed
only to be doing so for academic purposes, for it failed to apply the test to
the facts before it and instead reversed a plaintiff’s judgment in part upon
the unforeseeability of the risk.97 Another early case, Oakes v. Geigy
Agricultural Chemicals,98 relied on comment j for a similar result. There,
the plaintiff suffered a serious skin reaction to the defendant’s weed-killing
chemical products, a danger the defendant’s warnings did not mention.
Citing comment j, the court ruled that the complaint was defective for
failing to allege that the defendant knew or should have known that its
products could cause the plaintiff’s condition. Affirming the defendant’s
demurrer to the claim, the California Court of Appeal reasoned that a
producer is strictly liable only for risks of which it was or should have been
aware, for otherwise such firms would unacceptably become insurers
against all risks, no matter how unforeseeable.99
As other courts increasingly applied the new “strict” products liability
principles during the early 1970s, they too sometimes proudly crowed that
they were applying § 402A’s strict standard of liability while they
simultaneously restricted responsibility to consequences that were
foreseeable, sometimes drawing on comments j and k. One such case was
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,100 the first decision to uphold a
verdict for an installer of asbestos insulation materials against
manufacturers of such products.101 The plaintiff’s claim was based on strict
liability for failing to warn of the dangers involved in handling asbestos.102
Citing Dean Wade’s early article and two of Dean Keeton’s articles, Judge
Wisdom prominently quoted the Helene Curtis court’s adoption of the
Wade-Keeton test, set forth above.103 But, when it came to resolving the
94. 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
95. Id. at 847.
96. Id. at 850 (“This definition demonstrates that the only change from the traditional
negligence analysis is that the maker cannot be excusably ignorant of the defect . . . .”).
97. See id. at 856 (citing Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963)).
98. 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Ct. App. 1969).
99. Id. at 713–14.
100. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 1088.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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knowability issues in the case, the Borel court ignored the Wade-Keeton
test and instead applied the foreseeability-limitation principles of comment
j,104 holding that “[a] product must not be made available to the public
without disclosure of those dangers that the application of reasonable
foresight would reveal.”105 Thus, while purporting to apply liability
principles that were strict, a few early courts simply refused to banish
unforseeability as a limitation on responsibility.
B. The Decline of Competing Doctrine
1. The Consumer Expectations Test
Notwithstanding powerful moral reasons for protecting consumer
expectations,106 this ideal proved incapable of serving as an adequate
standard of products liability that could provide appropriate relief to
consumers in a variety of important situations. In particular, this standard
unduly frustrated recovery in cases involving obvious dangers, complex
products, and bystanders. In each of these contexts, this test operated to
protect manufacturers rather than consumers, even when a product was
quite clearly defective from a risk-utility perspective.107 And so the
consumer expectations test withered over time, particularly in the 1980s
and thereafter, as more and more courts abandoned it for a comparative
(cost-benefit) evaluation of the benefits of a manufacturer’s decision to
forego untaken precautions in light of the foreseeable risks its product
might contain.108 Just as the rise of the consumer expectations test during
104. See id.
Here, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ product was unreasonably
dangerous because of the failure to give adequate warnings of the known or
knowable dangers involved. As explained in comment j to section 402A,
. . . . [t]he requirement that the danger be reasonably foreseeable, or scientifically
discoverable, is an important limitation of the seller’s liability. In general, “[t]he
rule of strict liability subjects the seller to liability to the user or consumer even
though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product.” Section 402A, Comment a. . . . [But] a seller is under a duty to warn of
only those dangers that are reasonably foreseeable.
Id.
105. Id. at 1090. Because the jury was properly instructed, the court affirmed the verdict for
the plaintiff. Id. at 1090–92, 1103.
106. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 463–65 (1993) (explaining how the law’s protection of
consumer expectations powerfully protects autonomy and equality).
107. See, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d
794, 796, 798–99 (Wis. 1975) (ruling against a toddler severely brain-damaged when he climbed
into ungated above-ground pool, access to which could easily have been blocked by self-closing
gate).
108. The virtues of cost-benefit evaluation of product dangers, and how cost-benefit analysis is
preferable to consumer expectations as a standard of liability, involve a host of considerations
examined elsewhere. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 57, §§ 5.7, 8.4; Dominick Vetri, Order Out of
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the 1960s and 1970s had opened manufacturers to responsibility for harm
from unforeseeable product risks, its decline after 1980 served to restore
unforeseeability as a liability shield for industry.109
2. The Wade-Keeton Test
By the 1980s, courts and commentators with increasing frequency were
challenging the logic and fairness of the Wade-Keeton test’s abandonment
of foreseeability. Finally recognizing the problems in eliminating
foreseeability’s indispensible role in liability determinations, Deans Wade
and Keeton themselves both repudiated the test that bore their names: Dean
Wade asserted in a journal article in 1983 that he never meant what he had
said,110 and Dean Keeton, in his tort law treatise the following year,
admitted that he no longer believed what he had said.111 Explicitly
rejecting the Wade-Keeton test, the Products Liability Restatement notes
with pith: “The idea has not worn well with time.”112 Most courts focusing
on the Wade-Keeton approach have agreed, rejecting hindsight analysis
and limiting a manufacturer’s liability to risks that are foreseeable.113
While a few courts continue rotely to restate in dictum earlier liability
formulations in Wade-Keeton terms,114 this test—and its rejection of
foreseeability—is now widely consigned to the trash heap of defunct
doctrine.115
Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1373–79 (2009).
109. The rise and fall of the consumer expectations test is detailed in OWEN, supra note 57, §§
5.6, 8.4.
110. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 764 (1983).
111. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, at 697–98 n.21, 701–02.
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 Reporters’ Note to cmt. l
(1998).
113. See, e.g., Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777, 779–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)
(declining to extend Arizona’s hindsight test from design to warning defect cases and holding by
implication that the duty to warn extends only to foreseeable risks); Anderson v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557–58 (Cal. 1991); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477
(Cal. 1988); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922–23 (Mass. 1998) (holding
that duty to warn of hazards of silicone breast implants is limited to foreseeable risks); OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 641 n.8 (Md. 1992); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d
374, 386 (N.J. 1984); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ohio 1996); Young v. Key
Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 68 (Wash. 1996).
114. See, e.g., Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1153 (Ill. 2005) (Fitzgerald, J.,
specially concurring); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995) (citing Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983)); Sipes v. General Motors Corp., 946
S.W.2d 143, 156 (Tex. App. 1997).
115. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 8.7 (chronicling the rise and fall of the Wade-Keeton test,
and opining that its time “has come and gone”).
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C. The Rise of State of the Art
While manufacturers of most products are at least generally aware of
the kinds of hazards that lurk within their products before they are sold to
consumers and cause harm, dangers are sometimes simply unknowable
before a product is sold and put to use. Blood infected with serum
hepatitis, formerly undetectable before transfusion into a person, was a
prime example in earlier times, 116 as was the AIDS virus in blood products
prior to the development of reliable tests during the early 1980s.117
Similarly, pharmaceutical drugs, chemicals, and other substances—such as
asbestos products in former times and nanotech products today—may only
be discovered to have toxic effects long after such products are marketed
and harm consumers, sometimes generations later. If such dangers prove to
have been foreseeable, discoverable with appropriate pre-market testing or
analysis, and if the hazards were avoidable by appropriate warning,
processing, or redesign, then manufacturers of such products may be held
responsible for the harmful consequences of failing to discover or avoid
those risks under ordinary principles of negligence, warranty, and strict
liability in tort. But if the risks were in fact unforeseeable—
“unknowable”—before consumers began to suffer harm, the question of
responsibility for failing to warn about (or otherwise address) such
unforeseeable risks becomes more complicated.
As science and technology evolve over time, and as new and improved
methods for discovering and eliminating hazards are developed, public
attitudes toward risk and responsibility also evolve. In the second decade
of the twenty-first century, people expect much more safety in machine
guarding, automotive crash protection, and fabric flammability than they
did in 1900, or even in 1950.118 Yet it is difficult to know what the safety
expectations of consumers are (or should be) with respect to food,
biologics, and other products whose most basic properties have been
fundamentally and microscopically reconfigured in ways that generate
unknown risks that even scientists and engineers cannot fathom.
In the early 1960s, before § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
was promulgated and adopted by the courts, the few courts considering the
issue held that a manufacturer had a duty to warn only of such risks “the
116. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem’l Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ill. 1970)
(rejecting state-of-the-art defense). While various screening and testing approaches in recent years
have substantially reduced this risk, an undiscoverable residuum remains. See Centers for Disease
Control, Public Health Service Inter-Agency Guidelines for Screening Donors of Blood, Plasma,
Organs, Tissues, and Semen for Evidence, www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ preview/mmwrhtml/00043883.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
117. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 16.9.
118. “A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features which are
incorporated in automobiles made today.” Bruce v. Martin–Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th
Cir. 1976).
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manufacturer knew, or by the application of reasonable developed human
skill and foresight should have known.”119 And then, in 1965, came the
strict liability standard of § 402A which appeared to preclude any
possibility of a “state-of-the-art” defense based on the unforeseeability of a
product risk, as previously discussed.
As the risk-utility test for design defectiveness increasingly displaced
the consumer expectations standard around the nation,120 and as the WadeKeeton constructive knowledge test fell into desuetude, the relevance of
state-of-the-art evidence in design defect cases became increasingly clear.
In balancing the costs and benefits of a design feature that would have
prevented the plaintiff’s injury, courts widely came to recognize the
salience of state-of-the-art evidence on the issue of the defectiveness of a
product’s design.121 In warning cases involving “unknowable” risks of
harm, state-of-the-art evidence played an even more central role.
Notwithstanding the approach of a few early decisions,122 most courts,
even on strict liability claims and often under a state-of-the-art umbrella,
eventually recognized the need to shield manufacturers from an obligation
to warn of risks that are unforeseeable, a critical development to which we
now turn.
D. Foreseeability’s Pivot
America’s experiment in strict producer responsibility experienced a
sharp pivot in the early 1980s, completely reversing direction. It was 1982
119. Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 395 P.2d 1007, 1011–12 (Colo. 1964) (en banc) (so stating
the duty to warn in negligence law, yet drawing from a tentative draft of § 402A comment j). This
was true in both negligence and implied warranty. See, e.g., id. (concerning both claims); Ross v.
Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13–14 (8th Cir. 1964) (concerning both claims); Cudmore v.
RichardsonBMerrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App. 1965) (concerning implied warranty).
120. See Owen, supra note 61, at 987–89 (examining this development).
121. See, e.g., Folsom v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1378 (M.D.
Ga. 2007) (noting that “the state of the art at the time the product is manufactured” is one factor in
the risk-utility analysis); LaBelle v. Philip Morris Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517–22 (D.S.C. 2001)
(noting no design defect if plaintiff unable to prove availability of technology to make safer
cigarette); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1347 (Conn. 1997) (holding that such
state-of-the-art evidence is “relevant and assists the jury in determining whether a product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous”); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo.
1993) (en banc) (“State-of-the-art evidence is clearly admissible and is a factor to consider in
determining whether a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous due to a defective
design.”); Falada v. Trinity Indus., 642 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 2002) (holding state-of-the-art
statutory defense inapplicable to defectively welded product that injured plaintiff); Hughes v.
Massey–Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 295–96 (Iowa 1994). Some courts allow defendants to
introduce state-of-the-art evidence in rebuttal of a plaintiff’s proofs of the feasibility of an
alternative design. See, e.g., Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). This is only
logical, since “state of the art refers to what feasibly could have been done.” Mercer v. Pittway
Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 622 (Iowa 2000) (external citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1

594

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.,123 one of the landmark cases of products liability law.
Beshada was the first state high court case in the United States to apply the
Wade-Keeton test and, more generally, the principles of strict products
liability to a warning claim defended on the ground that the risk was
unforeseeable. This was the first such case, that is, which squarely
confronted the question of whether manufacturers should have a duty to
warn of unknowable product risks. Beshada was another asbestos case
brought by insulation workers who suffered asbestosis and mesothelioma
from working with asbestos insulation products over many years.124 The
workers claimed that the manufacturers had breached their strict liability
duty to warn of these dangers, and the defendants responded by asserting a
state-of-the-art defense—that they had no duty to warn because the danger
to such workers of low doses of asbestos was “undiscovered at the time the
product was marketed and that it was undiscoverable given the state of
scientific knowledge at that time.”125 The trial court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to strike the state-of-the-art defense, but the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed, holding that compliance with the state of the art is not a
defense to a strict liability claim for failure to warn.126
Reaffirming its prior endorsement of the Wade-Keeton test,127 the court
observed that state of the art is essentially a negligence defense, and that
the defendants’ argument was that, by failing to warn of an unforeseeable
risk, they were not at fault. “But in strict liability cases,” the court
explained, “culpability is irrelevant.”128 That the product “was unsafe
because of the state of technology does not change the fact that it was
unsafe. Strict liability focuses on the product, not the fault of the
manufacturer.”129

123. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
124. Id. at 543.
125. Id. at 542.
126. See id. at 543, 549.
127. See Freund, 432 A.2d at 931.
128. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546.
129. Id. (citing W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 398, 408 (1970)). The court explained:
When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a duty on them to
warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect of strict
liability. By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendants to have done
something that is impossible. In this sense, the phrase “duty to warn” is
misleading. It implies negligence concepts with their attendant focus on the
reasonableness of defendant’s behavior. However, a major concern of strict
liability—ignored by defendants—is the conclusion that if a product was in fact
defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its victims for the
misfortune that it inflicted on them.
Id.
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After considering the duty to warn of unforeseeable risks from a
doctrinal perspective, Beshada turned to an inquiry of the compatibility of
the policies underlying its strict products liability principle with a rule
imposing liability on manufacturers for failing to warn of dangers that were
undiscoverable when the product was made and sold.130 The court
explained that holding producers liable for harm caused by undiscoverable
risks achieves the risk-spreading goal by spreading the costs of injuries to
all who benefit from a product’s distribution.131 As for deterrence, the
court reasoned that forcing manufacturers to absorb the costs of all such
harms, foreseeable or not, should spur investment in safety research,
thereby advancing product safety.132 Finally, the court sought to avoid the
expense and “vast confusion” that would arise from requiring plaintiffs to
prove at trial “the concept of scientific knowability” inherent in the stateof-the-art defense.133 For all these reasons, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Beshada ruled that strict liability in tort imposes a duty on
manufacturers to warn of all significant product hazards, knowable and
unknowable alike.
The New Jersey court may have expected its unanimous decision to be
largely noncontroversial: after all, it merely applied the Wade-Keeton test
(still, then, widely accepted) to a warning claim, which it and other courts
had done before; it applied the doctrine to defendants in a singularly
unpopular industry; and it merely held that its rule of “strict” products
liability was truly strict, rather than just negligence rehashed. But the
opinion unleashed an immediate and powerful storm of academic
protest.134 The commentators complained that, by imposing a duty on
manufacturers to warn of unknowable dangers, the New Jersey Supreme
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id.
132. “By imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create an
incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research.” Id. at 548.
133. Id. Such proof—of what kind of knowledge could have been discovered with more or
better research—would require costly, confusing, and time-consuming expert testimony on “the
history of science and technology to speculate as to what knowledge was feasible in a given year.”
Id. The court doubted that juries would “be capable of even understanding the concept of scientific
knowability, much less be able to resolve such a complex issue,” and it was reluctant to allow the
judicial system to suffer the resulting costs. Id.
134. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877–82 (1983); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty
to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892,
901–05 (1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 754–56 (1983); William R. Murray, Jr., Case Comment,
Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71
GEO. L.J. 1635, 1635-37 (1983); Robert D. Casale, Comment, Beshada v. Johns Manville Products
Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 1008–15 (1983); Robert D. Towey,
Note, Products Liability—Strict Liability in Tort—State-of-the-Art Defense Inapplicable in Design
Defect Cases, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 625, 634–42 (1983).
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Court had adopted an unfair standard that was impossible to meet; that it
would lead to inefficient corporate behavior that could lead to strategic and
unnecessary declarations of bankruptcy;135 that it revealed ignorance of
how liability rules affect corporate behavior; and that it applied
anachronistic strict liability rationales that had become discredited over
time.136 And at least in part because of Beshada, Deans Wade and Keeton
both repudiated the Wade-Keeton test, as previously discussed. 137
A scant two years after rendering Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in 1984 had an opportunity to reconsider its now-battered decision in
another products liability case, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,138 which
involved a claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer for a possibly
unforeseeable risk that a tetracycline drug could discolor an infant’s
teeth.139 In one of the most striking pivots in the history of the law of torts,
the New Jersey court, again unanimously, effectively overruled Beshada,140
holding that “drug manufacturers have a duty to warn [only] of dangers of
which they know or should have known on the basis of reasonably
obtainable or available knowledge.”141 Turning Beshada completely on its
head, the Feldman court not only ruled that state of the art was a good
defense to a warning claim, but it also largely equated strict liability and
negligence in the warning context. Most significantly, Feldman abandoned
Wade-Keeton’s hindsight approach to gauging risk and endorsed comment
j’s restriction of the warning duty to risks that are foreseeable.
By holding that manufacturers have no duty to warn of risks that are
unknowable at the time,142 the New Jersey court in Feldman made a
complete about-face from the position it had so proudly endorsed in
Beshada, just two years earlier. In dramatic fashion, the Beshada–Feldman
duo marks the pivot of the duty to warn of unknowable hazards—and more
broadly, industry’s responsibility for dangers that are unforeseeable—not
only in New Jersey, but widely in American law.

135. Indeed, in 1983, the year following Beshada, Johns-Manville itself declared bankruptcy,
followed by the bankruptcy of scores of additional asbestos companies in later years. See generally
Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the
Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 736 (1985).
136. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681 (1980).
137. See supra notes 110–11.
138. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
139. Id. at 376–77.
140. The court denied that it was “overruling” Beshada, but it subjected the decision to house
arrest, explicitly restricting it to its facts. Id. at 388.
141. Id. at 376.
142. Reasoning that information on the knowability of risks in a particular field is more
accessible to manufacturers than to plaintiffs, the court also ruled that defendants should bear the
burden of proof on the availability of information about a risk at the time a product was made and
sold. Id. at 388.
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E. The Triumph of Foreseeability
Feldman may have been the turning point in foreseeability’s revival,
but much work remained. It took another fifteen years or so before
foreseeability was widely (if incompletely) restored across America to its
rightful place at the center of private law. This process included ongoing
reform efforts by courts, state legislatures, and the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability—a process that also occurred in Europe and
spread around the globe.
1. Judicial Reform
Four years after Feldman, across the continent, the California Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Superior Court,143 another pharmaceutical drug
case, which involved the duty of manufacturers to warn of the possibly
unforeseeable risk that a drug, diethylstilbestrol (DES), administered to
pregnant women could cause birth defects in their unborn children.
Following Feldman and the principles of comments j and k,144 the
California court ruled that manufacturers of the drug were not accountable
for failing to warn of risks “that were neither known by defendants nor
scientifically knowable at the time the drug was distributed.”145 Three years
later, the California Supreme Court completed the loop in an asbestos case,
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,146 by extending the holding
in Brown beyond pharmaceutical drug products to products generally.147
Like Feldman, Anderson adopted the requirement of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts that strict liability for failure to warn is grounded upon
the foreseeability of risk.148
Despite these developments, a handful of states continued to cling fast
to the Wade-Keeton idea that strict liability should be defined in hindsight
terms so as to impute to manufacturers constructive knowledge of all
product dangers, even risks that are entirely unknowable. In 1987,
answering a certified question in an asbestos case, the Hawaii Supreme
Court ruled that “in a strict products liability action, state-of-the-art
evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing whether the
seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangerousness of his
143. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
144. The court interpreted comment k in terms of foreseeable risk: Comment k “provides that
the producer of a properly manufactured prescription drug may be held liable for injuries caused by
the product only if it was not accompanied by a warning of dangers that the manufacturer knew or
should have known about.” Id. at 475.
145. Id. at 481; see also Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1354 (Cal. 1996) (“Drug
manufacturers need only warn of risks that are actually known or reasonably scientifically
knowable.”).
146. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
147. “Brown’s logic and common sense are not limited to drugs.” Id. at 556.
148. Id. at 557.
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or her product.”149 In 1995, the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Wade-Keeton test imputed knowledge definition of design
defectiveness,150 and a few other decisions have continued perfunctorily to
state the definition of strict products liability in tort in hindsight form.151
Each of these cases might be viewed as an aberration in the common law,
which now for many years has been attempting to purge itself of the WadeKeeton liability approach and the constructive knowledge standard that it
spawned, and rarely does a modern court attempt to justify the hindsight
test in policy terms.
But the appropriateness of a state-of-the-art defense based on the
unforeseeability of a product risk was precisely the question raised in
Sternhagen v. Dow Co.,152 a 1997 Montana Supreme Court case involving
an action against herbicide manufacturers for a crop duster’s death from
cancer resulting from exposure to the herbicide 2,4-D years before.153
Carefully reexamining the nature of and reasons for Montana’s
commitment to the doctrine of strict products liability in tort, Sternhagen
concluded that manufacturers should have a duty to warn of unknowable
product risks.154 The Montana court’s proud reaffirmation of a pure

149. Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987).
150. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995). The New Mexico
Supreme Court elaborated:
[I]n those hypothetical instances in which technology known at the time of trial
and technology knowable at the time of distribution differ—and outside of
academic rationale we find little to suggest the existence in practice of
unknowable design considerations—it is more fair that the manufacturers and
suppliers who have profited from the sale of the product bear the risk of loss. . . .
If in some future case we are confronted directly with a proffer of evidence on an
advancement or change in the state of the art that was neither known nor knowable
at the time the product was supplied, we may at that time reconsider application of
a state-of-the-art defense to those real circumstances . . . .
Id. at 63.
151. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 8.7 (collecting and examining the cases).
152. 935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997).
153. Id. at 1140. Sternhagen responded to a question certified by a federal district court:
In a strict products liability case for injuries caused by an inherently unsafe
product, is the manufacturer conclusively presumed to know the dangers inherent
in his product, or is state-of-the-art evidence admissible to establish whether the
manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable human foresight should
have known of the danger?
Id. at 1139.
154. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that, in a strict products liability case, knowledge of any
undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer.
Furthermore, we conclude that, in a strict products liability case, state-of-the-art
evidence is not admissible to establish whether the manufacturer knew or through
the exercise of reasonable human foresight should have known of the danger.
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doctrine of strict products liability is reminiscent in many respects of the
New Jersey court’s ill-fated opinion in Beshada decided now so many
years ago.
Whether Sternhagen eventually will suffer as sharp a collapse as
Beshada is difficult to predict, but by the 1990s, the tide had sharply turned
against a duty to warn of unknowable product risks. In that decade, the
high courts of at least four other states studiously affirmed or reconfirmed
the necessary role of foreseeability in duty-to-warn products liability
cases—two with respect to prescription pharmaceutical products155 and
two with respect to products generally.156 Further, all four states repudiated
any notion of a duty to warn of unknowable risks. Of these four, the
experience of the Massachusetts high court is most instructive.
The evolution of the unknowable-risk warning issue in Massachusetts
appeared to mark the final demise of a duty to warn of unknowable risks.
In 1984, four months before New Jersey repudiated Beshada in Feldman,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts specifically addressed the
role of state-of-the-art evidence in warning claims for breach of that state’s
strict products liability doctrine, which rests on the implied warranty of
merchantability.157 Drawing on Beshada, the Massachusetts court in Hayes
v. Ariens Co.158 adopted the Wade-Keeton constructive knowledge test in
no uncertain terms.159 Although the Massachusetts high court reaffirmed
this position in dictum in 1992,160 it had occasion to confront the matter

Id. at 1147.
155. Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ohio 1996); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc.,
922 P.2d 59, 62–63 (Wash. 1996).
156. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998); Owens-Illinois,
Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 641 n.8 (Md. 1992).
157. Massachusetts, which never adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort, uses the implied
warranty of merchantability as its vehicle for strict products liability. See Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at
923; OWEN, supra note 57, §§ 5.3, 5.9.
158. 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1984).
159. The court explained:
For strict liability purposes, and therefore for purposes of our warranty law, the
adequacy of a warning is measured by the warning that would be given at the time
of sale by an ordinarily prudent vendor who, at that time, is fully aware of the
risks presented by the product. A defendant vendor is held to that standard
regardless of the knowledge of risks that he actually had or reasonably should have
had when the sale took place. The vendor is presumed to have been fully informed
at the time of the sale of all risks. The state of the art is irrelevant, as is the
culpability of the defendant. Goods that, from the consumer’s perspective, are
unreasonably dangerous due to lack of adequate warning, are not fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used regardless of the absence of fault
on the vendor’s part.
462 N.E.2d at 277–78.
160. Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass. 1992).
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squarely once again in 1998, whereupon it slammed the door shut on strict
liability and that doctrine’s rejection of foreseeability, even more firmly
than New Jersey had in switching from Beshada to Feldman in the early
1980s.
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.161 was a negligence and implied
warranty of merchantability action against the manufacturer of silicone
breast implants for atypical autoimmune disease suffered by a woman in
whom such products had been implanted. The trial court denied the
defendants’ request for a jury instruction limiting its duty to warn to known
or knowable risks, the plaintiff prevailed at trial, and the defendants
appealed. While upholding the plaintiff’s verdict on other grounds, the
Vassallo Court took the occasion to reevaluate its strict liability (warranty)
duty-to-warn rule which “presumes that a manufacturer was fully informed
of all risks associated with the product at issue, regardless of the state of
the art at the time of the sale.”162 Recognizing that it was “among a distinct
minority of States that applies a hindsight analysis to the duty to warn”;163
that most states follow the foreseeability limitation of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment j;164 that the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) similarly limits the duty to warn to
foreseeable risks;165 that the goal of product safety is not advanced by a
rule which requires the impossible;166 that the minority approach “has
received substantial criticism in the literature”;167 and that an important
basis for its original adoption of the hindsight approach, New Jersey’s
adoption of that approach in Beshada, had disappeared,168 the Vassallo
court decided to revise its law to state that producers have no duty to warn
of “risks that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale or could
not have been discovered by way of reasonable testing prior to marketing
the product.”169
161. 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
162. Id. at 922.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 923. The duty to warn under § 2(c) is defined in black-letter terms of
“foreseeable risks of harm,” and comment m provides in part: “The harms that result from
unforeseeable risks—for example, in the human body’s reaction to a new drug, medical device, or
chemical—are not a basis of liability.”
166. Vassollo, 696 N.E.2d at 922–23.
The thin judicial support for a hindsight approach to the duty to warn is easily
explained. The goal of the law is to induce conduct that is capable of being
performed. This goal is not advanced by imposing liability for failure to warn of
risks that were not capable of being known.
Id.
167. Id. at 923.
168. Id. at 922.
169. Id. at 923.
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While the Vassallo court’s decision to shield manufacturers from
responsibility for unforeseeable product hazards appeared to signal the
final demise of true strict liability principles that reject foreseeability’s
central role in American law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin soon made
clear that any such signal was premature. In 2001, the Wisconsin high
court decided Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.,170 in which a health
care worker brought suit for a severe reaction to allergens in latex gloves
manufactured by the defendant—a danger the health care industry
apparently did not know about at the time the plaintiff’s gloves were
manufactured. Reaffirming the consumer expectations test as the proper
standard for determining a defendant’s responsibility for harm under the
doctrine of strict products liability in tort, the court ruled that the
foreseeability of risk was relevant only to negligence, not strict liability.
“[U]nder no circumstance,” said the court, “must the plaintiff prove that
the risk of harm presented by the product that caused his or her injury was
foreseeable.”171 The court justified its refusal to endorse a state-of-the-art
defense on the conventional (if by then largely abandoned) rationales for
strict products liability in tort—promoting product safety, protecting
justified consumer expectations, and the perceived fairness of placing the
loss on the party that created and profited from the risk.172 While time has
taken its toll on these tattered rationales,173 their unabashed resurrection by
the Green majority and the Sternhagen court shows that they still possess
at least a twitch of life.
But for a smattering of rogue if robust judicial opinions,174 supported by
a surprising number of quixotic if enthusiastic theorists,175 American law,
170. 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001).
171. Id. at 746.
172. Id. at 749–51.
173. See OWEN, supra note 57, § 5.4.
174. A number of courts over the last quarter century have reaffirmed their commitment to a
truly “strict” products liability doctrine uncontaminated by principles of foreseeability, fault,
negligence, or state of the art. See Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (imputing to manufacturer all knowledge available at time of trial); Johnson v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (ruling that state-of-the-art evidence on the
foreseeability of the risk is inadmissible on a strict tort claim); Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
879 N.E.2d 893, 899 (Ill. 2007) (stating, in dicta, that “in a strict liability action, the inability of the
defendant to know or prevent the risk is not a defense”); Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139,
1144–47 (Mont. 1997) (rejecting state-of-the-art defense in strict products liability case because it
raises reasonableness and foreseeability issues relevant to negligence which would abandon the core
principles of modern products liability law); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62–63
(N.M. 1995) (endorsing Wade-Keeton hindsight test); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629
N.W.2d 727, 736B52 (Wis. 2001) (holding that foreseeability of risk is irrelevant to consumer
expectations test for determining if a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous).
175. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian
Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988); Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993);
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as the modern law of most of the world,176 no longer holds producers
responsible for unknowable risks.177 Infrequent cases involving egregiously
dangerous products that never should have been marketed for widespread
use, such as asbestos178 and thalidomide,179 are likely to continue to tempt
courts to hold manufacturers responsible for unknowable product risks.
Yet, to the extent that such risks truly are unforeseeable, industry cannot be
faulted for placing such products on the market, nor can producers
effectively be encouraged by the law to guard against risks they cannot in
fact foresee. While innocent victims of the excesses of science and
technology often suffer economic distress therefrom, most reasoned
observers conclude that the laudable objective of spreading risks
(insurance) is more fairly and efficiently administered by insurance
institutions—private companies and public agencies designed to
compensate for accidental loss—than by the law of torts.180 In sum, judicial
reform over the last quarter century has shown that private law is quite
surely better off without a rigid principle of strict liability requiring
producers to warn or otherwise protect against the unknowable risks of
modern science and technology.

Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification
for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990); Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness
in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory
of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2001); Douglas
A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1790 (2003); Stephen F.
Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932
(1993); see also Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001).
176. See infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.
177. For a recent repudiation of the hindsight test, see Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d
777, 779–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to extend that state’s hindsight test from design- to
warning-defect cases and holding, by implication that the duty to warn extends only to foreseeable
risks). Other cases addressing the repudiation of the hindsight test are collected in OWEN, supra
note 57, § 8.7 n.38.
178. See, e.g., Bugosh v. I.U. N. Am., Inc., 971 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2009) (dismissing defendant’s
appeal in asbestos case that sought to replace Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A with
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, resulting in affirmance of judgment on verdict
for plaintiff on strict liability principles that excluded foreseeability and other negligence concepts).
179. Thalidomide, widely prescribed as a sedative for morning sickness in much of the world
during the 1950s and 1960s, caused severe limb deformities in children born to women who took
the drug while pregnant. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle
of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 313–14 (1992). The FDA’s protracted review of the drug
barely saved most Americans from this terrible tragedy. See id. (characterizing thalidomide as “one
of the most potent human teratogens ever found”); see also Anita Berstein, Formed by
Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2154
(1997).
180. See Owen, supra note 106, at 486.
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2. Statutory Reform
From the inception of the products liability statutory reform movement
in the late 1970s,181 many state legislatures have sought to protect industry
from liability when a challenged product was designed, produced, and
labeled according to the state of scientific knowledge and technological
capability prevailing in the industry at the time. Colorado may have been
the first state to enact such a provision, in 1977,182 and Florida, so far, may
be the latest, in 1999.183 Many states afford full state-of-the-art
protection,184 by conditioning liability on a defendant’s ability to conform
to the state of the art, an approach that places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff,185 or by creating a state-of-the-art affirmative defense, which
places the burden of proof on the defendant.186 Other states have enacted
rebuttable presumptions providing that products that conform to the state
of the art are presumed to be nondefective and that manufacturers and
sellers of such products are similarly presumed not negligent.187 And some
states have enacted statutes that address the admissibility of state-of-the-art
evidence, either by providing that a defendant may introduce evidence of
the prevailing scientific knowledge or technology at the time of
manufacture or sale,188 or that a claimant may not introduce evidence of
improved science or technology developed thereafter.189
3. The Products Liability Restatement
During the 1990s, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
explicitly limited a manufacturer’s principal duties in terms of foreseeable
risk. Thus, a product “is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
181. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469–70 (2006); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 212 n.21 (1990).
182. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1) (West 2005).
183. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1257 (West 2005).
184. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN, MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10:7, at 661–68 (2000).
185. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2948(3) (LexisNexis 2004); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-63(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
186. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1) (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.764 (West 2008);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (LexisNexis 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-g (LexisNexis
2009).
187. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1) (West 2005); IND. STAT. ANN. § 34-20-5-1
(LexisNexis 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (West 2006).
188. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1257 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(1)
(LexisNexis 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-10.1 (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28105(b) (LexisNexis 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West 2007).
189. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-404
(West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1406 (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3307 (2005).
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have been reduced or avoided by . . . reasonable instructions or
warnings . . . [the omission of which] renders the product not reasonably
safe.”190 A parallel provision on the duty of safe design includes a similar
foreseeability limitation.191 Unknowable risks, these provisions make
abundantly clear, lie outside a producer’s responsibility for reasons of both
fairness and efficiency.192 While the Restatement’s foreseeability
limitations alone resolves the unknowable risk question, its further
requirement that a plaintiff prove that some alternative “reasonable”
warning (or design) could have prevented the accident underscores the
necessity that any required warning (or design) be within the scientific
knowledge and technological capabilities of a prudent manufacturer
seeking to make its products reasonably safe. Warning of unforeseeable
hazards is impossible by any definition and so would never be required by
a liability standard based on reasonableness.193
No matter how reform-minded some Restatements of the Law may be,
they inevitably are somewhat conservative, looking backwards to a large
extent in “restating” the law that courts have declared in the past. So, it
should come as little surprise that the Products Liability Restatement failed
to address how the law might adjust to the kinds of fundamental changes to
the natural order of science and technology that have sprouted up in the
nearly two decades since this Restatement was conceived, and the dozen
years since it was published. Yet, the Third Restatement’s clear limitation
of a producer’s responsibility to foreseeable risk reflects the difficult
lessons learned from the great strict liability experiment, and it reveals how
plainly that experiment failed. Moreover, the complex manipulation of
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
191. See id. § 2(b).
192. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
Most courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, the
balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be
done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably
attainable at the time of distribution. To hold a manufacturer liable for a risk that
was not foreseeable when the product was marketed might foster increased
manufacturer investment in safety. But such investment by definition would be a
matter of guesswork. Furthermore, manufacturers may persuasively ask to be
judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is reasonably possible for
manufacturers to conform. For these reasons, Subsections (b) and (c) speak of
products being defective only when risks are reasonably foreseeable.
Id.; see also id.§ 6(c)–(d) (limiting design and warning responsibility for prescription drugs and
medical devices to foreseeable risks of harm).
193. Various comments buttress these basic provisions in § 2(c). Noting the complexities in
risk assessments of prescription drugs, medical devices, and toxic chemicals, comment m states that
there is no liability for selling such products if their risks are unforeseeable. Further, in addressing
the duty to warn of “adverse allergic or idiosyncratic reactions,” comment k provides that there is
no duty to warn of risks of unforeseeable allergic reactions. Finally, comment m makes clear that
the purpose of a seller’s duty to test is to discover such risks as are reasonably capable of discovery.
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doctrine necessary to “restate” the law in this Restatement compellingly
illustrates how convoluted the law had become during the quarter century
of evolving legal doctrine when courts professed that liability was “strict,”
while they simultaneously restored foreseeability to the center of private
law.194 Be that as it may, the Third Restatement makes crystal clear that
manufacturers should not be accountable for unforeseeable risks of harm.
4. Foreign Law
Like America, Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s hotly debated
whether the law should shield industry from liability for the unforeseeable
risks of science and technology. The issue was far from academic on the
European continent, which then was still reeling from the ravages caused
by thalidomide, a drug prescribed to pregnant women across Europe during
the 1950s and 1960s, that proved to be horribly teratogenic.195 Spurred by
the thalidomide tragedy and by America’s widespread adoption of § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,196 and after nearly a decade of study
and debate, the European Economic Community (“EEC”) in 1985 adopted
a Directive on Liability for Defective Products,197 holding producers
“strictly” liable for physical harm caused by defective products.198
As drafts of the Directive circulated around the various European
parliaments and legal establishments in the early 1980s, the most hotly
debated provision was its state-of-the-art defense, referred to in Europe as
the “development risk” defense.199 By the time the EEC finally adopted the
194. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241 (1994); David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 748–51.
195. See supra note 179.
196. See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective
than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 989, 992 (1998);
Geraint G. Howells & David G. Owen, Products Liability Law in America and Europe, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY ch. 9 (2010).
197. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
198. See id., art. I.
199. Some European commentators distinguish the development risk defense from the state-ofthe-art defense. See GERAINT G. HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
§ 4.1.3 (2d ed. 2005); Hans C. Taschner, Harmonization of Products Liability Law in the European
Community, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 21, 31 (1999). Other commentators appear to equate the two. See
Manfred Wandt, German Approaches to Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 71, 84 (1999). On
the development risk defense, see generally C. JOHN MILLER & RICHARD S. GOLDBERG, PRODUCT
LIABILITY ch. 13, at 489–528 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2004); JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT
LIABILITY 236–42 (Butterworths 1994); Howells & Owen, supra note 196; Geraint G. Howells &
Mark Mildred, Infected Blood: Defect and Discoverability—A First Exposition of the EC Product
Liability Directive, 65 MOD. L. REV. 95, 101–04 (2002); Jane Stapleton, Bugs in AngloBAmerican
Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1225, 1243–52 (2002).
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Directive in 1985, America had already passed the Beshada–Feldman
pivot point, restoring foreseeability of risk under the state of the art as a
liability requirement. Perhaps Europe learned from this experience, for the
Directive included the defense in its final draft: Article 7(e) permits a
manufacturer to defend a claim by proving “that the state of scientific and
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation
was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.”200
Still controversial at the time, the Directive made this one defense optional
for the individual European states, yet only two (of the presently twentyseven member states) elected to deny it altogether.201
Many other nations have adopted clones of the European Directive,
including its important provision shielding industry from responsibility for
the harmful effects of science and technology unknowable at the time a
product was developed. Japan’s products liability law adopts an identical
principle,202 and similar provisions exist in Korea, Australia, Israel,
Taiwan, Turkey, Slovenia, and other nations around the world.203 And so,
over the last quarter century, foreseeability has reclaimed its central role,
not only across America but around the globe—from Trenton to San
Francisco, Boston to Houston, London to Copenhagen, Budapest to
Madrid, and from Rome to Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Sydney,
Jerusalem, and Taipei—as a vital protective shield surrounding producers
of new technologies with unknown risks.204
V. BENDING NATURE, BENDING LAW
A. Bending Nature and the Puzzle of Responsibility for
Unforeseeable Risk
The law’s decision to construct an impregnable foreseeability cocoon
around industry, sheltering it from responsibility for harm deemed
unforeseeable, worked quite well from the beginning of the industrial
revolution well into the century just passed. As the 1900s opened their
200. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, art. 7(e), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29. For a discussion of Article 7(e), see, for example, Jane
Stapleton, Liability for Drugs in the U.S. and EU: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 REV. LITIG. 991, 1018–
29 (2007).
201. Only Luxembourg and Finland opted to omit this defense entirely. See Mathias Reimann,
Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a
Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 780 n.138 (2003). Spain excludes from the defense
liability for the sale of defective medicines and food, Germany excludes pharmaceuticals, and
France excludes products (like blood) derived from the human body. Id.
202. See LUKE NOTTAGE, PRODUCT SAFETY AND LIABILITY LAW IN JAPAN 124–31 (2004).
203. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the TwentyFirst Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 780 n.40 (2003).
204. See id. at 780–81 (asserting that, “on a worldwide level, the defense is, in principle,
available in all but a very small number of jurisdictions”).
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doors, dangers to be foreseen came mostly from a small number of
contrivances and substances whose dangers were quite apparent—
locomotives, industrial machinery, automobiles, oil, gas, and electricity.
While the elements and forces in such products were then just beginning to
be comprehended, the dangers if those forces escaped their confines could
readily be understood by the scientists and engineers who conceived the
products. With appropriate testing, that is, most dangers lurking in the
products of the early 1900s were foreseeable (indeed, foreseen) by
producers and users alike. And so private law a century ago was
comfortable in bounding responsibility for the harmful consequences from
such products with the concept of foreseeable risk.
Fashioning a proper role for foreseeability during the second half of the
last century proved far more difficult, as the previous discussion has
revealed. In the 1950s, many of the older technologies remained dominant,
so that the foreseeability principles of earlier times still worked well
enough. But then the Great Strict Liability Experiment, beginning in the
1960s and lasting for about a generation, turned traditional fault-based
concepts of responsibility on their heads. In time, however, as the law
came to recognize the frailties in “strict” enterprise responsibility for the
harmful consequences of new science and technology, it restored principles
of fault that rested on reasonable efforts to prevent foreseeable risks of
harm. By the time the last century was drawing to a close, the private law
had quite firmly reestablished foreseeability and fault as proper ideals for a
fair and efficient system of responsibility for harm in modern law.205
Yet, quickly turns the world. Over the very recent past, radical changes
in how scientists and firms use nature—now twisting its fundamental
properties—raise anew old questions on the fairness and logic of allowing
enterprises to escape responsibility for harmful consequences behind an
impenetrable shield of unforeseeability. How can anyone know what
harmful results ultimately may flow from ever-more creative applications
of nanotechnology that reconstruct the atomic makeup of matter, as by
205. “[S]trict liability as a doctrinal or analytical category of accident law is dying, and should
be absorbed within negligence liability.” Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 BUFF.
L. REV. 245, 246 (2008). For a sampling of academia’s support for returning to traditional
principles of foreseeability and fault, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The
Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 661 (1978); Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and
Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 (1997); James
A. Henderson Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 377 (2002); Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Owen, supra note 106; David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703–07 (1980); Priest, supra note 57; Alan
Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistribution, 51 IND. L.J. 558 (1976); Steven
D. Smith, The Critics and the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 765 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 681, 681 (1985). For opposing academic authority, see supra note 175.
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fashioning synthetic microbes to ride inside nanotech submersibles injected
in human blood to find and destroy bacteria attacking healthy human
cells?206 How should the law respond if a rogue microbe in a new medicine
like this diverts to reproductive regions of the patient, altering their
structure unforeseeably, so that, ultimately, the patient’s children’s children
are born with three ears instead of two? Or what if artificial-intelligence
scientists succeed beyond their wildest imaginations in engineering new
microorganisms to “think” and learn to adapt as they progress toward
preprogrammed goals?207 What might be the consequence, for example, if
robot “brains” are fashioned from such new technologies, leading such
robots (possibly very tiny “nanobots”) eventually to decide to strengthen
themselves for self-protection, to replicate, and maybe even to form whole
armies of robots (or nanobots) that ultimately might challenge the authority
of their human creators? While consequences like these may seem farfetched today, accelerating developments in science and technology
continue to bend the fundamentals of nature with consequences that simply
cannot be foretold.208
The question for private law in a world that includes an expanding array
of products of rapidly changing science and technology is to determine the
extent to which foreseeability should continue to protect producers of new
products from the harm those products assuredly will sometimes cause to
human beings. Most particularly, the law will have to determine if its
rejection of strict liability was premature, if requiring firms to internalize
all the harmful consequences they cause may indeed be the optimal, and
fairest, principle of responsibility for harm. If so, then the law may decide
to bend itself anew by banishing foreseeability once again as an element of
legal responsibility. Or the law may choose instead to leave foreseeability
as a requirement of liability but to bend this doctrine to suit the new
environment. Of course, private law itself could be banned from this realm,
leaving private markets and ex ante regulation by public agencies as the
primary means for addressing the problem of unforeseeable harm from new
sciences and technologies.209 While each of these approaches to addressing
206. “In the long term, some researchers envision nano-robots that are capable of navigating
throughout the body, repairing tissue and injuries, destroying tumors, removing atherosclerotic
plaques, and even performing gene therapy.” Khanijou, supra note 6, at 182–83.
207. See, e.g., John Markoff, Ay Robot! Scientists Worry Machines May Outsmart Man, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/science/
26robot.html?_r=1&emc=eta1. On how the law should treat thinking robots, see F. Patrick
Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. __
(2010) (forthcoming)
208. “Ideas and technology that were once characterized as belonging exclusively to the realm
of science fiction are now ‘science reality’ as scientists developed novel techniques to manipulate
matter.” Khanijou, supra note 6, at 180.
209. For example, scholars are beginning to focus on public regulation of nanotechnology. See,
e.g., Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 374
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responsibility for harm from bending nature is worthy of sustained inquiry,
some implications of each can be briefly sketched out here.
B. The Paradox of Foreseeable Unforeseeability
Before we return to the problem of how private law should address
unforeseeable consequences of science and technology gone awry, it may
be helpful to reconsider the meaning of “unforeseeability” and how a
finding of unforeseeability affects a victim’s claim for harm. Although
private law has largely restored foreseeability as a requisite of liability,
foreseeability may be conceived in an expansive way that protects victims
of unexpected harm from technology rather than the other way around.
This is because unexpected consequences of new science and technology
may be viewed in a sense as more and more foreseeable, not less. That is,
the more that humans tinker with the fundamentals of nature by reshaping
its basic makeup, the more we should expect the unexpected. Our present
understanding of the laws of science is based on nature as it presently is
constructed, not as humans choose to reconstruct it at an elemental level.
Victor Frankenstein, convinced that he had discovered the secret of life,
probably did not think about how his unnatural creation might wreak havoc
on the lives of those around him.210 But, one might ask, just what did he
think would result from tinkering with the fundamentals of life itself?
Within the question lurks the answer: foreseeability includes all risks
actors fairly may be deemed to expect, and the more seriously actors
interfere with Mother Nature, the more serious may be the consequences of
whatever type, as they well know. And so, while neither Victor nor any
other scientist in his position would likely have contemplated the explosive
fury of his creation, he fairly may be held accountable for all the
consequences that resulted from turning nature on its head. Call this
“foreseeability,” or call it something else, but responsibility for the
consequences from mucking about with the rudiments of nature surely
widens to embrace a wide swath of unexpected harm. Put rhetorically,
what else but unexpected consequences might an actor fairly expect from
bending nature in fundamental ways? This is the paradox of foreseeable
unforeseeability.
How this paradox should affect responsibility for unforeseeable harm
from bending nature is difficult to say. Certainly, if unknown consequences
are reasonably expectable, at least in a general way, then their realization
fairly may be viewed as “foreseeable” and, hence, as falling within the
ambit of responsibility. Actors cannot complain about being held
responsible for consequences of their actions they should fairly
contemplate, and this principle sometimes may apply when humans twist
Mother Nature in new and untoward ways. Admittedly, putting the paradox
(2007); Mandel, supra note 38, at 1347.
210. See MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818).
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of foreseeable unforeseeability to use so expansively undermines the
limiting effect of foreseeability, its defining force. For this reason, courts
should cautiously and sparingly apply the paradox, perhaps limiting it to
situations where industry has recklessly let loose untested new technology
with frightening potential consequences.211
C. Bending Foreseeability
One virtue of the paradox of foreseeable unforeseeability is that it
reveals foreseeability’s enormous flexibility. Indeed, how more flexible
can a concept be than to deny itself? Scholars long have reviled
foreseeability for this very feature, complaining that its inherent vagueness
provides it with so little decisional guidance that it is meaningless,
vacuous, and indeterminate: “in one sense, everything is foreseeable, in
another sense nothing [is].”212 While flexibility in a legal concept indeed
weakens its predictability, flexibility (“unfair competition,” “best interests
of the child,” “due care”) also provides breathing room for decision makers
to bend doctrine to individualize justice in discrete cases. This is so with
foreseeability, which is strengthened by this feature, one that gives it power
to mold the legal consequences from unknown risks to each new situation.
One example of the many ways in which foreseeability may flexibly
expand to embrace risks that might seem to fall outside the realm of
contemplation involves what H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré call “ulterior
risks.”213 These are risks widely viewed as “normal and ordinary” though
not “which a reasonable man would have in contemplation and take into
account in planning his conduct”—such as the risk that negligent driving
will endanger the rescuer of a child threatened by the driving; or that a
victim of the negligent driving may “suffer further injury from negligent
medical treatment, or from a fall while attempting to walk on crutches; or
that the injured man may be left lying in the highway, where a second car
211. “An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a broader
range of harms than the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33(b) (2010). See
generally David G. Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of
Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 784–87 (1977)
(explaining why reckless misconduct fairly expands a manufacturer’s scope of responsibility for
harm).
212. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 10, at 232 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 259 (2d ed. 1955)); see also Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and
Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1039, 1046 (2001) (stating that foreseeability is “so open-ended [that it] can be used to explain any
decision, even decisions directly opposed to each other”); OWEN, supra note 57, § 13.5, at 890
(observing that “the innate vagueness of ‘foreseeability’ renders it “virtually meaningless as a
device for determining the scope of liability in actual cases”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many
Faces of Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 156 (2000) (“Foreseeability is undoubtedly a
muddle in the law of negligence.”).
213. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 10, at 263–65.
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will run over him.”214 To this list, one might add the risk that the victim
will suffer unexpectedly severe injuries due to a particularly thin skull.215
Although these hazards are not the types of consequences upon which
actors normally dwell while acting,216 the Second Restatement reasons,
they all are “normal” consequences of negligent driving and so fairly
should be included “within its scope.”217 While one might agree with the
Restatement that such risks lie so far outside ordinary foreseeability as to
require drawing on some independent notion of scope of risk,218 such a
view ignores the broader kind of reflective foreseeability that many courts
intuitively apply in widening the scope of consequences under the
reasonably foreseeable umbrella. This broader, more abstract form of
“foreseeability” reflects the kind of objective fairness perspective that
embraces the reciprocal nature of a wrong that underlies the private law.219
Foreseeability thus expands creatively to catch hazards that somehow seem
remote but that nonetheless are ripe for capture under a liability umbrella.
Particularly in the context of unexpected harm from new sciences and
technologies, damages (as well as liability) might be adjusted according to
the foreseeability of the consequence: the less foreseeable the result, the
lower the damages, and vice versa. By this approach, which might be
dubbed “comparative foreseeability,” an actor otherwise responsible would
be liable for some proportion of a victim’s harm, even if the result were
highly unexpected. In fact, the law already applies this principle, indirectly,
under the authority of comparative fault, since fault itself is grounded in
the foreseeability of risk.220 So, as novel as a principle of comparative
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1965); see also id. § 281 cmts. e–f. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm addresses responsibility for
injuries to rescuers in § 32 and for enhanced harm from efforts to render medical aid in § 35.
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31
(2010).
216. See Francis H. Bohlen, Book Review, 47 HARV. L. REV. 556, 557–58 (1934) (reviewing
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933), and arguing that applying
foreseeability to such risks “strain[s] the idea of foreseeability past the breaking point”).
217. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1965).
218. This was the view of the Second Restatement, see id., and it appears continued in the
Third Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. e & Reporters’ Comments thereto (2010) (explaining view that a scope-of-risk standard
more comfortably embraces appropriate risks than foreseeability).
219. See Owen, supra note 4, at 1288–90. This is a Kantian, “reciprocity” conception of
responsibility that links doers and sufferers of harm. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 145 (1995) (positing that “negligence law unifies doing and suffering”); Allan
Beever, Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
475, 491–92 (2008); Ripstein, supra note 3, at 362 (“The reciprocity conception views
responsibility as a relation between persons with respect to expected consequences.”).
220. See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1285–86
(2009); Benjamin Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2009).
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foreseeability may seem at first, private law already embraces this notion to
some extent.
Holding producers strictly liable—accountable in private law even for
consequences that are unforeseeable—is one way to address the frightening
prospect of nanotech robots ravaging neighborhoods and schools, but it is a
rigid way to address the problem of responsibility for unexpected harm that
the law rejected, for good reason, not too distantly in the past. A more
flexible approach, capable of accommodating diverse technologies
producing diverse consequences, is to retain foreseeability as a shield to
liability, but to apply it flexibly in particular instances—perhaps with
respect to damages as well as liability, as just discussed. That is,
foreseeability is quite certainly best retained, but bent, as warranted by the
circumstances of each new technology that goes awry, according to the
ever-changing abilities of scientists and technologists to understand the
consequences of their endeavors to improve the human condition by novel
quests into the great unknown.
D. Bending Private Law
Enforcing an unforeseeability limitation on responsibility for harm from
new technology shifts such injury problems from private law to other
institutions. Foreseeability doctrine, that is, casts victims of unforeseeable
harm from tort law into whatever other nets may (or may not) help to break
their fall. Closing the arms of private law to victims of such harm finds
justifications in both fairness and efficiency—in fairness, because
enterprises bear no moral responsibility for causing harm they cannot
foresee; and, in efficiency, because firms cannot effectively insure or
otherwise guard against harm that is unpredictable. And so, when the
harmful effects of science and technology are truly unforeseeable, the
traditional functions of private law—especially deterrence and
compensation—are best left to other institutions.
Deterrence is best addressed by private markets in which firms compete
with one another for consumers of their products. Pharmaceutical
companies, for example, suffer significant competitive disadvantage from
publicity that their drugs or medical devices are causing harm to
consumers, no matter how vigorously such firms may protest the
unforeseeability of that harm. In addition, many products are subject to
substantial safety regulation, both prior to marketing and once such
products start misbehaving in consumer hands. Prescription drugs and
medical devices are so regulated, of course, by the federal Food and Drug
Administration, as are consumer products by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, automobiles by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and workplace products by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.
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Compensation, often said to be the other major function of private law,
is grounded in the idea of corrective justice that an actor should return a
monetary equivalent of whatever health or property the actor has taken
unfairly from the victim.221 Although unforeseeable harm would be
uninsurable by itself, first-party private insurance—of health, life, and
disability—provides reasonable and efficient coverage against
unforeseeable risks. 222 For many of those persons who do not have such
first-party coverage, public welfare insurance can supply some basic
coverage, at least for health.223 Moreover, public compensation schemes
can be established for special types of cases to protect against particularly
unfair types of harm, such as unexpected side-effects from mandatory
childhood vaccines224 and loss of life from terrorist attacks.225
To the extent that people have insufficient insurance of any type,
private or public, they will be unable to recover compensation for their
losses. But this should not be looked at as a reason for distorting private
law, which properly seeks only to correct private injustices, not to assure
that no persons suffer ill effects from the many risks of life, including
death from influenza and lightning strikes.226 By providing a legal umbrella
for those who put science and technology to use in making products, the
foreseeability limitation on responsibility for harm appropriately eliminates
221. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (explaining how private
law rests on corrective justice); George P. Fletcher, Book Review, Corrective Justice for Moderns,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1658 (1993) (reviewing JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) and
explaining how private law rests on corrective justice ); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007) (offering an internal,
reparative construct of private law); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 71 (1998) (“[T]he fundamental basis of corrective justice
theory . . . is that justice requires that a tortfeasor restore those whom his wrongdoing has injured.”).
222. See Owen, supra note 106, at 492; Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate
Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
689, 736 (1985).
223. See Owen, supra note 106, at 484–93.
224. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–22 (2006)
limiting private liability for vaccination lawsuits); see also Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing
Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (2004) (reviewing current trends in vaccinating children); Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L.
REV. 951, 958 (1993); Whitney S. Waldenberg & Sarah E. Wallace, When Science is Silent:
Examining Compensation of Vaccine-Related Injuries When Scientific Evidence of Causation is
Inconclusive, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303 (2007).
225. See, e.g., George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 175 (2007); Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Case for Specially
Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Attacks: An Assessment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 901 (2007)
(questioning the appropriateness of such compensation funds).
226. See Owen, supra note 106, at 484–93 (explaining limited realm of private law and
superiority of other institutions for handling problem of compensation for injuries from
unforeseeable risks).
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private law’s protection for victims of harm that no one reasonably could
foresee, leaving such persons to find relief from whatever other private and
public institutions more harmoniously embrace such misfortunes within
their mandates.
In sum, the harmful consequences from bending nature are best
addressed in private law by a robust principle of foreseeability. By nature
limber, foreseeability bends comfortably around novel problems and is
otherwise fully armed and ready to do justice in unknown future situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
A half century in the past, American law began a great experiment in
holding firms responsible for unforeseeable harm from the products of new
science and technology. The premise at the time—under a bold, new,
“strict” standard of responsibility for producers whose products
unforeseeably went awry—was that human safety expectations should take
precedence over the best efforts of industry to avoid all risks it could
foresee. Foreseeability, that is, was cast outside this realm of private law.
Over two or three decades, the pieces of this radical effort to bend the law
around the new products of human ingenuity rapidly unraveled, and
foreseeability reemerged from exile to reclaim its central role in bounding
responsibility for harm. By the end of the last century, foreseeability had
once again become ensconced, seemingly more secure than ever, in private
law governing responsibility for harm.
Yet the world in very recent years has been changing fast, with
spectacular advances in how humans are bending nature in ways that serve
their needs and wants. Explosive changes in how matter can be altered to
serve new ends are now beginning to bear productive fruit. Modern
products look strangely different from the comparatively simple products
of physics, chemistry, and biology that provided humans with their
pleasures, tools, medicines, and nutrition over most of the century that
ended but a decade in the past. Biotech corn and soybeans have just about
replaced such foods designed by nature; electronic cigarettes that deliver
nicotine without carcinogenic smoke may soon displace ordinary
cigarettes; scientists now pluck genes from humans, and piggyback them
on viruses and bacteria, to make hormones to treat disease; nanotechnology
is used ever more widely to restructure the atomic makeup of products of
all types; and, most recently of all, stem cells are being manipulated to
produce human sperm and eggs in scientific labs. No doubt humans across
the planet will reap many benefits from these and other untold advances in
science and technology in the years ahead. Yet, just as surely, bending
nature so substantially will engender human suffering, sometimes grave
and unforeseen.
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The challenge to private law in this environment of rapid technological
change will be to resist the temptation to abolish industry’s protective
foreseeability cocoon, as modern science and technology sometimes
frighteningly go awry. America fell into this grievous trap once before,
during the last half century, leading it to shackle industry with a fateful
principle of “strict” producer liability, and it took at least a generation to
correct the resulting legal mess. Even today, some courts and scholars
continue to be allured by the seductive beauty of strict producer liability, as
if to a Venus Flytrap. Yet expelling foreseeability from the rules of liability
ignores the elemental value of this aspect of private law, its
indispensability as a central feature of any theory of accountability for
causing harm. And this mistaken effort to bend the law around the excesses
of technology is also totally unnecessary, in view of foreseeability’s
adaptive flexibility for doing justice in novel contexts. Foreseeability well
adjusts to each new problem nature throws its way, and it remains the ideal
fulcrum at the center of private law for defining proper boundaries of
responsibility for each new fluke that scientists fail to contemplate.
As new technologies are invented and put to use, they will no doubt
continue to spew forth rafts of unexpected harms, some quite impossible to
imagine. Yet foreseeability’s moral grounding and robust flexibility
provide the private law with full power to adapt corrective justice to fit
novel situations. And, as nature bends, so can private law.
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